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3 
Balancing creditors’ claims against ‘home’ interests  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
There are a range of legal contexts in which a coherent legal concept of home could be 
usefully employed, including the conflict of interests between the occupiers of a property as a 
home and other parties with „non-home‟ interests in the property, for example, creditors.  The 
discussion of legal approaches in this area in Chapter Two has highlighted two key issues.  
Firstly, the idea that an occupier has an interest in the property linked to use and occupation 
as a home is clearly present in legal discourse.  The idea of the occupier‟s home interest has 
often penetrated policy debates, whether in the context of Law Commission reports, 
Parliamentary debate or judicial reasoning.  However, it is also clear that notwithstanding the 
persistence of home-type interests in discussion concerning creditor/occupier disputes, the 
creditor almost always succeeds in forcing the sale of the property once the debtor is in 
default.  When the home interest comes up against the financial claims of creditors to the 
capital asset represented by the home, the difference between these types of claim is stark.  
While the creditor‟s financial claim is objectively measurable and easily valued in money 
terms, the „home‟ interest is often dismissed as a chimerical concept, not subject to legal 
proof, not „real‟ in the way that the creditor‟s financial claim is real, and therefore an interest 
that the court cannot protect.
1
   
                                                 
1
 For example, in Le Foe v Le Foe [2001]EWCA Civ 1870 Ward LJ recognised that the disputed property: 
„…has been her home and her mother‟s home.  There is huge emotional investment in it.‟; [10] before 
concluding that: „…the protection of her emotional security…is, of course, an interest I cannot protect.‟ [13]  
The portrayal of the home interest as incomprehensible to legal reasoning is captured in Lord Scott‟s description 
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 The systematic priority accorded to commercial claims rather than home interests is 
maintained by the following cycle of events: starting from the presumption that the interests 
of creditors ought to prevail on economic policy grounds, the cycle follows: creditors ought 
to prevail, so there is no need to investigate the meaning and value of the home interest.  The 
home interest is not explored in the courts therefore creditors continue to prevail.  This book 
starts from the premise that the importance of home, and the impact of losing one‟s home on 
occupiers, demands a more explicit analysis of the other side of the equation.  Drawing on 
research in other disciplines which has established the authenticity of home meanings, the 
elements that go to make up home interests, and the very real consequences, for an occupier, 
of losing one‟s home involuntarily, it seeks to identify some of the values of home which 
might inform a legal concept of home, and so be „weighed in the balance‟ on the occupier‟s 
side when decisions involving conflicts between home interests and commercial interests are 
considered by the courts.  If there was some framework by which the home interests of 
occupiers could be recognised in law, this would facilitate legal policymakers – both 
legislators and the judiciary – in attaching appropriate weight to the occupier‟s home interest 
when balancing it against the creditor‟s financial, „non-home‟ interest.   
This chapter focuses on the initial premise from which the cycle of reasoning outlined 
above originates: the presumption that the occupier‟s „home‟ interest can be dismissed 
without any real attempt to unpack the occupiers‟ claim, since economic policy dictates that 
the interests of secured creditors must prevail in any event.  The general trend has been to 
accept that: „…where there are debts outstanding, a sale should be ordered…‟2  As Gibson LJ 
stated in Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v Bell: „…a powerful consideration is and 
                                                                                                                                                        
in London Borough of Harrow v Qazi [2003]UKHL 43, of the „home‟ interest as: „…something ethereal, 
floating in the air, unconnected to bricks and mortar and land.‟ [145]  
2
 Re Lowrie [1981]3 All ER 353 at 355-6, per Walton LJ. 
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ought to be whether the creditor is receiving proper recompense for being kept out of his 
money, repayment of which is overdue.‟3  This pro-creditor position can be justified on 
several grounds.  For one thing, the debtor owes a contractual obligation to the creditor, by 
facilitating the exercise of the creditor‟s remedies of possession and sale, the court is merely 
enforcing that contract.  Another frequently cited argument is the importance of protecting 
the creditor in order to ensure that they remain willing to lend money to home owners.  Since 
the expansion of owner occupation depends on the availability of credit, it is reasoned, the 
law must safeguard that flow of credit by protecting creditors in the event of default.  In fact, 
as Lord Templeman suggested in a House of Lords debate on the subject:  
No one has great sympathy for lenders or bank…[but] the point is that at the end of 
the day it is the borrower who pays, unless there is some speedy and efficient method 
of conveyancing.‟4      
These arguments appear to have largely been accepted, without question, in this jurisdiction.  
Neither policymakers nor legal academics have questioned the idea that the commercial 
interests of creditors must be protected and prioritised over other types of claim, such as 
home interests.  However, this discourse is largely unarticulated, but rather implicit to the 
policies adopted in Parliament and in the courts.   
The following sections will consider the economic arguments that have been 
advanced to support the routine prioritisation of the commercial claims of creditors over the 
home interests of occupiers.  These arguments in support of the pro-creditor bias will then be 
evaluated against a range of theoretical perspectives drawn from different schools of 
economic thought.  Finally, this chapter will consider the broader economic consequences of 
repossession and loss of home, as identified by social analysis.  The aim of this chapter is to 
                                                 
3
 [2001]2 All ER (Comm) 920, [31]. 
4
 437 HL Deb (5
th
 Series) col 650 (15 December 1982) Lord Templeman. 
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demonstrate that, while the idea that creditors must generally prevail has become trite, the 
economic and social consequences of repossession and forced sale are not straightforward but 
highly complex.  Rather than simply presuming that creditors must win, there is a need for 
further consideration concerning the appropriateness of the balance currently struck between 
creditors and home occupiers.   
 
ENFORCING THE CONTRACT 
 
From the most simplistic perspective, when the court grants the proprietary remedies of 
possession and sale – where judicial intervention is necessary in order to achieve these – the 
court order can be regarded as merely enforcing the contract agreed between the debtor and 
the creditor when the proprietary security was granted.  A contract is defined as: „…an 
agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognised by law.‟5  The court‟s 
role in ensuring that contracts are enforced is pivotal, since:  
…if there is one thing more than another which public policy requires, it is that men 
of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty in contracting, 
and that their contracts, when entered freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by the Courts of Justice.
6
 
In addition to the general „public policy‟ argument, the court‟s role in enforcing the terms of 
the contract is underpinned by both economic and moral arguments.  Taking firstly the 
„moral‟ argument, the enforcement of bargains between contracting parties is justified on the 
basis that, so long as the parties freely entered into the agreement, it creates a reasonable 
expectation which the law should enforce.  So the argument goes, that: „[w]hen all persons 
                                                 
5
 GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (11
th
 edn, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), p1. 
6
 Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson (1875)LR 19 Eq 462 at 465, per Sir George Jessel. 
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interested in a particular transaction have given their consent to it and are satisfied, the law 
may safely step in with its sanctions to guarantee that right be done by the fulfilment of 
reasonable expectations.‟7 
The proposition that valid contracts – freely entered into - should be enforced between 
the parties is, at a basic level, difficult to dispute.  However, it is important to bear in mind 
that, when balancing the interests of creditors and occupiers, the outcome will often have 
significant impact beyond the contracting parties themselves.  Although a creditor has no 
direct right of action against the non-debtor occupier, the exercise of remedies against the 
secured property itself has obvious implications on those in occupation.  While the issues 
surrounding the relationship between creditor and debtor have been extensively analysed,
8
 
less attention has been focused on the consequences for non-debtor occupiers, and the weight 
which ought to be attached to the home interests of such occupiers in competitions with 
creditors.  Yet, if the debtor shares the home with others – either non-debtor adults or 
                                                 
7
 D Hughes Parry, The Sanctity of Contract in English Law (Hamlyn Lectures, London, Stevens & Sons Ltd, 
1959), p4.  As Professor Goodhart later echoed: „…the moral basis of contract is that the promisor has by his 
promise created a reasonable expectation that it will be kept.‟; AL Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law 
(Hamlyn Lectures, London, Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1952) p10.  Hughes Parry went on to suggest that the moral 
dimension to the sanctity of contract was rooted in the ecclesiastical courts: „[t]here is no doubt but that the 
association of a breach of contract with the sin of breach of faith in the ecclesiastical courts and the readiness of 
the Court of Chancery to regard failure to perform one‟s promises as tantamount to bad faith and dishonest 
dealing, combined to give to contracts a measure of religious blessedness and to breaches of contract a mark of 
sinful or unethical aberration.‟; above, p 8.   
8
 See for example, I Ramsey (ed), Debtors and Creditors: A Socio-legal Perspective, (Abingdon, Professional, 
1986); G Howells (ed) Aspects of Credit and Debt (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993); J Ford, The Indebted 
Society: Credit and Default in the 1980s (London, Routledge, 1988), Elliott, Credit, the life of Commerce: being 
a defence of the British Merchant against the unjust and demoralising tendency of the recent alterations in the 
laws of Debtor and Creditor; with an outline of remedial measures (1845). 
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children – they will obviously be affected by the enforcement of proprietary security against 
the property.  While it is reasonable to argue that: 
The fact that all persons whose interests are affected by an arrangement have freely 
and with full knowledge agreed on that arrangement is, in general, cogent evidence in 
favour of its justice;
9
   
the application of this reasoning in the context of possession actions presumes that „all 
persons whose interests are affected‟ will have been party to the contract.  While the trend in 
legal policy after the decision in Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland10 has been to ensure, 
so far as possible, that all adult occupiers are joined in credit transactions affecting the shared 
home, a number of issues remain outstanding.  
 For one thing, the fact that a non-debtor occupier has not consented to a credit 
transaction goes only to the question of whether or not the non-debtor‟s share of the 
ownership of the property will take priority over the creditor‟s proprietary interest.  So, where 
an occupier is joined or consents to the transaction, they agree that the creditor‟s proprietary 
interest will take priority over their claim.  Again, the arguments for enforcing this contract – 
so long as it was freely entered into and with full knowledge
11
 - are valid.  However, there are 
two major gaps in this reasoning.  Firstly, even if a creditor does not succeed in establishing 
priority over the non-debtor occupier‟s share, this does not preclude the creditor from 
applying to the court for an order for sale.  Furthermore, as the discussion in Chapter Two has 
demonstrated, in the vast majority of cases, the court will grant the order for sale 
                                                 
9
 Hughes Parry, above n7, p4.   
10
 [1981]AC 487; for discussion of this decision and the consequences that followed, see ch 2. 
11
 The potential difficulties associated with the validity of consents from home sharing sureties are well 
rehearsed; see, for example, B Fehlburg, Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law (1997, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press); R Auchmuty, „Men Behaving Badly: An Analysis of English Undue Influence Cases‟  
(2002)11 Social and Legal Studies 257.  
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notwithstanding the non-debtor‟s interest.  Rather than enabling the occupier to retain the 
home, this claim becomes a claim against the capital proceeds following the forced sale.   
Secondly, a distinction may be made between debts which are secured against the 
property ab initio, and usually with the consent of any adult occupiers, and cases in which the 
creditor does not demand proprietary security at the time of the transaction, but later attempts 
to „inflate‟ his claim by seeking to secure the debt against the debtor‟s property ex post facto, 
for example, through a judicially imposed charging order.  Even when a creditor does not 
obtain proprietary security at the time of the credit transaction, the Charging Orders Act 1979 
allows the creditor to obtain a charging order against the debtor‟s property.  The charging 
order confers proprietary security over the debtor‟s property through court order rather than 
contractual agreement.  This has implications, in turn, on any non-debtors who occupy the 
property as their home.  As the discussion of the legal policies surrounding the grant of 
charging orders against jointly owned land in Chapter Two has demonstrated, the court‟s 
jurisdiction to grant a charging order secured against a debtor‟s beneficial interest in co-
owned land
12
 - and thus affecting a non-debtor‟s property - was conferred in the Charging 
Orders Act 1979.  However, the discussion that preceded this Act indicated that the outcome 
of this extension in the court‟s jurisdiction was more significant than the policymakers had 
expected.  In fact, Law Commission had anticipated that the existence of a charging order 
against the shared property would not render the non-debtor co-owner vulnerable to a forced 
sale at the hands of a creditor.
13
  The Commission predicted - wrongly as it turned out – that a 
court would refuse to follow the grant of a charging order with an order for sale when other 
                                                 
12
 Charging Order Act 1979, s 2(1)(a)(ii). 
13
 See generally, L Fox, „Co-owners, not Co-owers: Legislative and Judicial Policy in Relation to Charging 
Orders and Co-ownership‟ (1998)29 Cambrian Law Review 9.  
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(non-debtor) co-owning occupiers would be affected.
14
  However, the decisions in Lloyd’s 
Bank plc v Byrne
15
 and Barclay’s Bank plc v Hendricks,16 when the court ordered sale of the 
defendants‟ homes, involved just such circumstances: in both cases the debtor‟s wife was a 
co-owner and occupier of the family home, which had become subject to a charging order.  
Even though, in each case, the debtor‟s wife was neither a debtor herself, nor had she 
consented to the use of her home as security, the clear principle that emerged from these 
cases was that: „[w]here there was a conflict between a chargee‟s interest in a matrimonial 
home and the interests of the innocent spouse, the interests of the chargee prevailed except in 
exceptional circumstances.‟17        
The issue of affecting parties other than the debtor(s) through the enforcement of 
creditors‟ actions for possession and sale is complex, and often clouded by law‟s attitude 
towards the relationship between the debtor and the non-debtor occupier.  Non-debtor 
occupiers stand outside the contractual relationship between the creditor and the debtor.  
However, although it is sometimes suggested that both the creditor and the non-debtor 
occupier are „innocent victims‟ of the debtor‟s default, the classification of non-contracting 
occupiers as „innocent‟ parties is not unproblematic.  In fact, it has been suggested that 
occupiers – for example, the debtor‟s partner – cannot properly be regarded as innocent of the 
debtor‟s default in this context, either because there is a suspicion that the debtor and his or 
her occupying partner may have colluded to defeat the creditor‟s claim,18 or because non-
                                                 
14
 Law Commission, Charging Orders, Law Com No 74 (1976, London: HMSO) para 71. 
15
 [1993]1 FLR 369.  
16
 [1996]1 FLR 258 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Even in relation to Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland [1981]AC 487 – the high-water mark of pro-wives 
judicial policy, the shadow of collusion has been raised.  Gray & Gray make this suggestion with their comment 
that: „…the wife was not locked in mortal combat with her husband.‟; KJ Gray & SF Gray, Elements of Land 
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debtor occupiers are regarded as having already enjoyed the benefits of the loan, and „must 
take the good times with the bad.‟19  These ideas appear to implicitly underpin the balancing 
exercise between creditors and non-debtor occupiers.  For example, in discussion of the 
decision in Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland20 – the high-water mark of pro-wives 
judicial policy - the shadow of collusion has been raised, with the observation that: „…the 
wife was not locked in mortal combat with her husband.‟21  Templeman J, who heard the case 
at first instance, observed that the system governing security transactions affecting the home 
could prove difficult to operate if a wife: „…could say or allege at any time that he or she had 
contributed to the purchase price.‟22  The suggestion was that a wife who had no formal legal 
ownership interest may claim an interest in the property under an implied trust, ostensibly 
against her husband, but with the actual purpose of defeating the creditor‟s action for 
possession and sale.   
However, this is unlikely to arise in many cases, in practice, since creditors follow a 
practice of identifying, and seeking consent from all adult occupiers, unless they disclaim 
any interest in the property.  Rather, the issue at stake for these co-owning occupiers is the 
conversion of their interest in the home itself into a claim against the proceeds of sale, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Law (4
th
 Edn, 2005, Oxford, Oxford University Press), para 12.209, footnote 2.  Templeman J, who heard the 
case at first instance, observed that the existing system could prove difficult to operate if a wife: „…could say or 
allege at any time that he or she had contributed to the purchase price.‟; Boland (1978)36 P&CR 448 at 454.   
19
 See M Freeman, „Wives, Conveyancers and Justice‟ (1980)43 Modern Law Review 692, where, in relation to 
the Court of Appeal‟s decision in Williams & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland (which was affirmed by the House of 
Lords), Freeman noted that: „This was not a case in which a wife had been deserted by her husband who might 
well have been concerned to defeat her interest.  On the contrary, there is nothing to suggest that the lives of Mr 
and Mrs Boland were other than models of domestic felicity.‟; at 696.    
20
 [1981]AC 487. 
21
 Gray & Gray, above n18, [12.209], footnote 2. 
22
 (1978)36 P&CR 448 at 454. 
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without their involvement in the transaction upon which the creditor relies for his contractual 
rights.  When this consequence is justified by reference to the relationship between husband 
and wife, this raises major issues regarding the presumptions that are made about that 
relationship, and particularly about the autonomy of the non-debtor partner, and the degree of 
control that partner – often the female partner – is given over her ownership interest in the 
property.  This argument may be countered with the proposition that the non-debtor co-
owning occupier must „take the good times with the bad‟.  As Freeman suggested, in relation 
to the decision in Boland: 
Had Mr Boland‟s building business prospered, no doubt Mrs Boland would have 
 shared in the increased standard of living made possible by the successful use of 
 capital provided by the Bank.  Marriage is, after all, a partnership to which both 
 parties contribute.  Is there any justification for departing from the normal principle of 
 partnership, under which profits are shared if things go well, but losses are shared if 
 they go badly?
23
 
Once again, this argument does not adequately justify the proposition that the enforcement of 
the debtor‟s contractual relationship with the creditor is the basis for the presumption in 
favour of creditors that has dominated discourse in this area, even where other co-owning 
occupiers are affected by the outcome.  The principles that govern these disputes have been 
developed under the ambit of property law and contract.  Consequently, notwithstanding 
reform endeavours to the contrary,
24
 there are no „special rules‟ for spouses when a creditor 
                                                 
23
 Freeman, above n19, at 696. 
24
 After the decision in Boland, the Law Commission proposed that the rules governing priority should be 
altered by legislation providing that creditors were only required to make inquiries from spouses in occupation, 
but not from other occupiers: Law Commission, The Implications of William’s and Glyns’ Bank Ltd v Boland, 
Law Com No 115 (1982).  Although these proposals were put before Parliament in the Land Registration and 
Law of Property Bill 1985, the Bill was withdrawn from the Parliamentary calendar due to lack of time, and 
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seeks possession and sale of the home.  The idea that the general approach adopted by the 
courts can be justified on the grounds that spouses, having entered the contract of marriage 
with each other, can be regarded as „throwing their lot in with each other‟, such that a 
judgment creditor of one spouse should be permitted to procure the sale of the jointly owned 
home, does not provide an adequate justification for a principle that applies across the gamut 
of creditor/occupier contests.    
 Whether the dispute concerns the priority of interests between a creditor and a co-
owning non-debtor occupier, or the creditor‟s action for possession and sale of the jointly 
owned land, the same set of principles apply whether the co-owning occupiers are spouses, 
cohabitants or non-conjugal home sharers.  For example, although, as the House of Lords 
recognised in Williams and Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland, the decision in that case had social 
implications for wives,
25
 it was not because a „special protection‟ was extended to them, but 
because a discriminatory barrier that had previously prevented the law from recognising the 
occupation of a co-owning spouse had been removed.  The Boland decision can be described 
in short hand as establishing that: „…if there is actual occupation, and the occupier has rights, 
the purchaser takes subject to them.‟26  Thus it was true to say that:  
…the appeals [did] not…involve any question of matrimonial law, or of the rights of 
married women, or of women as such.  Exactly the same issue could arise if the roles 
                                                                                                                                                        
when the Bill was re-introduced the following year, to deal with unregistrable leases and the abolition of the 
minor interests index in unregistered land, the provisions relating to inquiries were not included. 
25
 Lord Scarman recognised: „…the undoubted fact that, if the two wives succeed, the protection of the 
beneficial interest which English law now recognises that a married women has in the matrimonial home will be 
strengthened.‟; [1981]AC 487 at 510. 
26
 Ibid at 504, per Lord Wilberforce. 
 135 
of husband and wife were reversed, or if the persons interested in the house were not 
married to each other.
27
  
Similarly, in relation to the decision to order the sale of a co-owned property, the relevant 
principles and provisions apply to all co-owners, not merely to spouses.  Consequently, any 
explanation of the policy adopted by the court across the range of contexts in which these 
actions arise, that seeks to explain the court‟s approach by reference to the marital 
relationship, must be incomplete.    
Not only is the idea that the creditor‟s contractual obligation must be enforced 
regardless of the consequences for other, non-debtor co-owners insufficient justification for 
the persistent pro-creditor approach adopted by the English courts, but it is highly undesirable 
from a gender perspective.  By permitting that a non-debtor co-owner, who has no contractual 
relationship with the creditor, can find their interest in their home relegated to a claim against 
the proceeds of the sale of the property without any involvement with the creditor, but based 
on their relationship with their co-owner, this legal doctrine raises difficult issues about the 
presumptions made by English law about the consequences of co-owning property.  While 
the presumptions outlined about are more understandable in the context of marital 
relationships, the argument that non-spouses (whether conjugal cohabitants or non-conjugal 
home sharers) should be regarded as having formed such a partnership, rendering their co-
owned home vulnerable to forced sale because of actions taken by one co-owner outside the 
context of the joint venture of co-ownership – for example, when one co-owner‟s personal 
debts are secured against the jointly owned property by means of a charging order - is 
difficult to justify.   
As a result, it is suggested that, notwithstanding the contractual obligation between 
creditor and debtor, the strength of „enforcing the contract‟ arguments must vary from case to 
                                                 
27
 [1981]AC 487 at 502. 
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case.  For one thing, a distinction can be drawn between acquisition and non-acquisition 
credit: while the occupier clearly benefits from acquisition credit since it provided the home 
in which they live, when dealing with non-acquisition credit, it will not always be clear that 
the non-debtor occupier has benefited directly or even indirectly from the transaction.  
Furthermore, the idea that the non-debtor co-owning occupier‟s interest can be dismissed 
with the suggestion that they may be in collusion with the debtor or that they „must take the 
good times with the bad‟ imposes a paradigm on all co-owners that is rooted in presumptions 
about marital partnership.  Such presumptions, while arguably justifiable on a technical basis 
between spouses, are inappropriate for other contexts.  The issues raised by the paradigm of 
collective interests in a shared home are considered in more detail in Chapter Seven, where it 
is argued that it would be preferable, from both a gendered and a general justice perspective, 
to view home sharing individuals as autonomous individuals, focusing on occupation of the 
home per se rather than the occupier‟s relationship with a debtor or membership within a 
„family unit‟.    
A related issue to be considered in this regard is the significance of the „enforcement 
of contracts‟ argument with regard to the treatment of child occupiers.  The interests of child 
occupiers are distinguishable from those of adult non-debtor occupiers on several grounds.
28
  
A minor cannot hold legal title to land, and, in the absence of express declaration, is unlikely 
to acquire an equitable interest in the property.
29
  In addition, contracts executed by minors in 
relation to an interest in land are voidable on majority, at the minor‟s behest.30  The 
                                                 
28
 For a detailed discussion of child occupiers and home, see ch 9.  
29
 The principles of resulting and constructive trust, rooted as they are in the requirements of financial 
contribution or an express agreement, arrangement or understanding that ownership of the property will be 
shared (Lloyd’s Bank plc v Rosset [1991]1 AC 107) are unlikely to give rise to interests in favour of children.  
30
 Clayton v Ashdown (1714)2 Eq Ca Abr 516; Whittingham v Murdy (1889)60 LT 956; Thurstan v Notts PBBS 
[1902]1 Ch 1; Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd [1978]AC 95. 
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marginalisation of child occupiers with regard to the creditor/occupier paradigm is 
highlighted by the fact that, even following the decision in Williams and Glyn’s Bank Ltd v 
Boland,
31
 when creditors became alerted to the necessity of obtaining consent from persons in 
actual occupation of property in order to ensure the priority of their charge, it became routine 
to seek consent from adult occupiers only.  In fact, as the Court of Appeal confirmed in 
Hypo-Mortgage Services Ltd v Robinson,
32
 even children who have a beneficial interest in the 
property following a declaration of trust are not regarded as being in „actual occupation‟ for 
the purposes of overriding status under section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925.  
When dealing with child occupiers, the child‟s interest in the property as a home is irrelevant 
so far as either property law or the law of contract is concerned.  Furthermore, the idea that a 
child occupier may have colluded with the debtor to defeat the creditor‟s claim, or that the 
child has benefited from the advance either directly or indirectly, and so must take the good 
times with the bad, is wholly inapt.   
The suggestion that allowing a secured creditor to force the sale of a home in which 
the creditor has a security interest (even if that interest only extends over a part share of the 
ownership) is merely „enforcing the contract‟ has provided a short-hand explanation for the 
approach adopted in many creditor/occupier contexts.  However, the argument that the 
interests of creditors must prevail over those of occupiers in order to satisfy the contractual 
obligations entered into by the parties does not provide a complete justification for 
disregarding the home interests of occupiers.  There is obviously more to it than that.  The 
following section considers another argument often advanced to support the pro-creditor 
position: the idea that commercial interests must prevail over home-type interests on the 
grounds of economic efficiency.  When it comes to enforcing proprietary security in an 
                                                 
31
 [1981]AC 487. 
32
 [1997]2 FCR 422. 
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economy that depends on credit, it has been suggested that creditor‟s actions against secured 
property must be enforced, since: „[e]conomic self-interest cannot afford the general 
disappointment of creditors‟ expectations.‟33  In the context of owner-occupied housing, one 
of the issues that has influenced legal policy is the potential impact of refusing sale on the 
willingness of creditors to lend money for home ownership.     
 
The availability of credit for home ownership  
Looking beyond the issues concerning the enforcement of security contracts, the priority 
accorded to the concerns of the creditor in the context of actions against domestic property is 
also based on economic arguments linked to the availability of credit.  There can be little 
doubt that the expansion of owner occupation, characterised by Lord Diplock in 1970 as the: 
„…emergence of a property-owning, particularly a real-property-mortgaged-to-a-building-
society-owning democracy‟;34 depended – and continues to depend - on the availability of 
credit.
35
  Thus, in light of the expansion of home ownership, the priority accorded to 
creditors‟ rights of enforcement on default became incontrovertible.36  The caution: „Remove 
the legal sanction and men will give credit with more care.‟;37 seems to have significantly 
influenced the development of legal policy in creditor/occupier disputes.  Before the 
                                                 
33
 Hughes Parry, above n7, p4. 
34
 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970]AC 777 at 824, per Lord Diplock. 
35
 See further, ch 5. 
36
 It is interesting to note, in passing, Sir Gordon Borrie‟s observation that: „…no Beveridge, no government set 
out a policy for Parliamentary approval that credit should be made so widely and readily available or on what 
conditions…commercial concerns made commercial decisions that fulfilled a growing public urge to borrow.‟; 
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introduction of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967, one member of the House of Lords argued 
that whatever measures were enacted, they ought not to: „...make it too difficult for a 
husband, when he is looking for a matrimonial home, to borrow money.‟38  This issue has re-
emerged time and again when legislators and courts have justified their pro-creditor 
approaches.  In fact, the arguments concerning willingness to lend are often expressed in a 
roundabout fashion, as protecting the occupier‟s interests, rather than focusing solely on the 
creditor‟s claim.  Thus, as Lord Templeman suggested in a House of Lords debate following 
the decision in Boland: „[n]o one has great sympathy for lenders or bank…[but] the point is 
that at the end of the day it is the borrower who pays, unless there is some speedy and 
efficient method of conveyancing.‟39  Any incursion into the protection of the creditor‟s 
ability to realise the security would, it was presumed, not only inhibit dealings in property, 
but would also: „...add to the expenses and complications of mortgages on houses and other 
dealings.‟40   
It is equally clear that the availability of funds for the acquisition of domestic property 
is not the only issue at stake here.  In Barclay’s Bank Plc v O’Brien,41 it was clear that the 
House of Lords was concerned with the ability of a home owner to capitalise on their equity 
in the home, in order to obtain funds for other activities, such as business enterprises.  Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson stated that:  
…it is important to keep a sense of balance in approaching these cases.  It is easy to 
allow sympathy for the wife who is threatened with the loss of her home at the suit of 
a rich bank to obscure an important public interest viz, the need to ensure that the 
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wealth currently tied up in the matrimonial home does not become economically 
sterile.  If the rights secured to wives by the law render vulnerable loans granted on 
the security of matrimonial homes, institutions will be unwilling to accept such 
security, thereby reducing the flow of loan capital to business enterprises.  It is 
therefore essential that a law designed to protect the vulnerable does not render the 
matrimonial home unacceptable as security to financial institutions.
42
   
The willingness of creditors to lend money to home owners – either for the acquisition of the 
property, or, subsequently, against the security of the debtor‟s equity in the home – is 
considered in this section.  One of the curious aspects of the reasoning set out above – the 
idea that creditor‟s will refuse to lend money unless their rights are strongly protected on the 
debtor‟s default – is that while the logic of this reasoning has rarely been questioned, it has 
been subjected to relatively little critical analysis.   
In 1931, Karl Llewellyn acknowledged, in relation to the argument that any 
diminution in the legal sanctions available to the creditor would have a negative effect on the 
availability of credit, that: „Speculation is unfortunately much easier than finding out, as well 
as less useful…My own guess is that in the main writers, both legal and other, tend to over 
estimate heavily the effects of law…‟43  Since then, empirical analysis has been carried out 
concerning the effect of personal bankruptcy exemptions on credit supply and demand,
44
 
which indicated that higher exemptions have: „…a significant, positive effect on the 
probability that households will be turned down for credit or discouraged from borrowing.‟45  
Furthermore, this empirical analysis has also indicated that the effect of lowering creditor 
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protections on credit availability is spread disproportionately across borrower income groups.  
While high-income households had the most to gain from high exemptions – that is, when 
creditor protections are lowered - low-income households experienced greatest difficulty 
obtaining credit in these circumstances.  Thus, Gropp et al concluded that: 
…while generous state-level bankruptcy exemptions are probably viewed by most 
policy-makers as benefiting less-well-off borrowers, our results suggest that they 
increase the amount of credit held by high asset households and reduce the 
availability of credit to low-asset households; ie, they redistribute credit toward 
borrowers with high assets.
46
 
The consequences, for the borrower, may take various forms, ranging from higher interest 
rates and higher qualification requirements for loans, increased collateral requirements, or 
more vigorous screening of loan applications.  Gropp et al suggested that since low-asset 
households pay higher interest rates in high exemption states, in contrast to high-asset 
households, who either have assets greater than the bankruptcy exemption level or are in a 
position to offer lenders greater collateral, lower income borrowers are more likely, when 
creditor protections are reduced, to experience difficulty with credit availability. 
These findings would appear to support the argument that, unless the law protects 
creditors, it is consumers – particularly, it would appear, low income consumers – who will 
be adversely affected because they will find it more difficult to obtain credit.  However, even 
though this premise appears to be supported by empirical analysis of the credit market, the 
application of this principle in the context of legal policy for creditor/occupier disputes 
indicates a presumption in favour of ensuring the widespread availability of credit, regardless 
of the debtor‟s ability to repay.  The policy of ensuring widespread availability of credit – 
particularly for low-income households – is intrinsically linked to the political ideology of 
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home ownership, which is analysed in more detail in Chapter Five.  The policy of successive 
British governments throughout the twentieth century in favour of home ownership depended 
on the availability of credit finance to fund owner-occupation.  The implications of this 
policy, particularly with reference to low-income households, will be considered further in 
the next section.  One issue which is noteworthy at this stage, however, is that the economic 
analysis that has influenced the development of legal doctrine in the field of creditor actions 
against domestic property has been selectively focused on the availability of credit finance to 
fund homeownership.   
This relatively narrow perspective has prioritised the availability of credit over and 
above other measures of economic efficiency in credit markets.  The argument that creditors‟ 
rights must be protected in order to ensure that credit finance remains widely available 
presumes that: 
the primary economic function of the credit market is to provide cheap funds, and that 
this function can only be accomplished when creditor rights are protected and 
sanctions on non-performing debtors are enforced.
47
  
This outlook has attracted considerable criticism by several commentators, who argue that in 
assessing the performance of the credit market, the availability of cheap credit has been 
inappropriately emphasised at the expense of other important factors – such as effective 
screening by the lender, insuring risk-averse entrepreneurs and protecting overconfident 
individuals and households.
48
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The links between legal policies in the context of creditor protections and these 
broader measures of economic efficiency was highlighted by Posner, in his seminal text, The 
Economic Analysis of Law.  Posner argued that these other factors - which can be summarised 
as effective gate-keeping by creditors – must be brought to bear when considering the law‟s 
attitude towards creditor protections.  For example, although it is generally assumed that 
where the law provides a high degree of creditor protection against default, this will have 
positive results in terms of credit availability, Posner cautioned that when lenders are aware 
that their interests will typically be preferred in the event of default by the debtor, they will be 
inclined to assume unjustified risks.  Higher creditor protections reduce the risks associated 
with lending for creditors, so encouraging riskier lending practices, which have been linked 
to higher rates of bankruptcy.
49
  Yet, while lower creditor protections encourage 
entrepreneurship, they are also linked to higher interest rates and higher rates of default.  
Although Posner acknowledges that the outcome of his analysis is ambiguous,
50
 the 
complexity of economic efficiency arguments in the context of creditor protections casts 
some doubt on the narrow approach that has appeared to inform legal analysis.  While the 
pro-creditor position has been justified in legal discourse by reference to the need for widely 
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available credit to fund home ownership, the focus on lending volume, at the exclusion of 
other measures of market performance, such as default rates, is questionable.  It may even be 
the case that economic efficiency in the credit market is not determined by the degree of legal 
protection afforded to creditors, but by other factors altogether.  In fact, several studies have 
suggested that an effective judicial system and macroeconomic stability are more significant 
as determining factors for the development and optimal performance of the credit market than 
the degree of legal protection conferred on creditors.
51
  If the legal approach to 
creditor/occupier contests is to be informed by economic analysis, a more comprehensive 
view of economic efficiency is required.  A broader range of economic (and non-economic) 
costs, linked to the creditor/occupier dispute, are considered further in later sections of this 
chapter.  Firstly, however, it is important to recognise another of the policy factors 
underpinning the pro-creditor preference of current law and policy: the goal of widening 
participation in the home ownership market.      
 
‘Widening participation’ in the home ownership market  
To date, the influence of economic analysis in the creditor/occupier context has emerged 
most strongly in relation to the availability of credit – that is, the willingness of creditors to 
lend money, either for the acquisition of the owned home (acquisition finance), or against the 
security of such a property (non-acquisition finance).  On the one hand, concerns regarding 
the availability of acquisition finance are clearly influenced by the government policy of 
expanding home ownership, discussed in Chapter Five.  The issue that has dominated 
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economic analysis in the legal context, in respect of acquisition credit, has been the 
willingness of creditors to lend capital to prospective home buyers, and so to support the 
government‟s policy of widening access to home ownership.  If the protection afforded to 
occupiers in their homes vis-à-vis creditors were to be bolstered, it is thought that this could 
potentially have a negative effect on the availability of acquisition credit, and so undermine 
the viability of widespread owner occupation.  On the other hand, concerns linking the pro-
creditor approach that has emerged in legal analysis of the creditor/occupier dispute have also 
been informed by a policy of promoting the „usability‟ of the home as security for non-
acquisition finance.
52
  When considering the impact on non-acquisition credit, any diminution 
in creditor protections could make it more difficult to secure subsequent credit against the 
owned-home, and so potentially inhibit entrepreneurial activity.  The concerns raised by each 
issue are clearly linked to distinct policy objectives: if the object is to support the expansion 
of home ownership, the key consideration must be the position of creditor supplying 
acquisition credit.  On the other hand, if the policy concern at stake is the „usability‟ of the 
home as a financial asset to support other activities, then the economic considerations at play 
must be evaluated in light of questions concerning the desirability of facilitating the 
securitisation of non-acquisition debts on the (family) home.
53
   
The previous section has indicated that the economic issues at stake in the 
creditor/occupier context are more complex than the discourse of credit availability would 
suggest.  However, even within a relatively narrow perspective that focuses on the 
availability of credit, the idea that it is necessarily desirable for credit to be readily available – 
particularly for low-income households – is questionable.  The empirical findings discussed 
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above suggested that lowering creditor protections would not impact particularly on high-
income households so far as credit availability is concerned, but could have negative effects 
on lending volume to low income households.  Where this is presented as an argument 
against attaching weight to the interests of occupiers – because „at the end of the day it is the 
consumer who pays‟ – it is worth considering the value of ensuring the availability of 
acquisition credit and non-acquisition credit for low-income households.   
In relation to the „usability‟ of the home as a financial asset to support other activities, 
arguments asserting the importance of strict creditor protections to enable home owners to 
use their properties as collateral security for non-acquisition debts are cast in an interesting 
light by evidence that the value of the home as a financial asset, which can be utilised to fund 
other activities, is limited for low-income households.  Smith has argued that the owner-
occupied home is increasingly regarded as a repository of wealth – by both the owner-
occupier and the state – and that the desire to release with wealth through securitisation of 
credit is strong, as wealth tied up in the home is currently regarded as: „…more “spendable” 
now than it will be ever again.‟54  However, in a recent study of low-income home owners, 
Burrows and Wilcox found that the homes of low-income households are not as „usable‟ as 
security for non-acquisition credit, but rather that: „[t]he housing assets of low-income home-
owners are tied up in their home for the duration of their lifetime, and provide very limited 
opportunities for them to alleviate their poverty.‟55  For low-income households, the idea that 
equity in the home is used to fund other activities through the securitisation of non-
acquisition credit was not supported by the research.  If concerns about the links between 
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lending volume and creditor protections are directed towards the use of the home as an asset 
against which to secure non-acquisition finance, then the evidence that lowering creditor 
protections has more impact on low-income households should be reviewed against the 
research findings that suggest that low-income households are unlikely to utilise their 
property in this way, in any event.  This is not to say that some low-income households may 
wish to use their property in this way, however, if the pro-creditor position that has 
influenced creditor/occupier contests to date is justified by reference to economic 
consequences, a more subtle analysis of the effects of legal doctrine on the economic interests 
of the relevant parties must be carried out. 
In relation to acquisition finance, the picture, once again, is complex.  On the one 
hand, the availability of acquisition credit for low-income households has particular 
resonance in light of the culture of home ownership and the benefits associated with buying 
your own home – whether in respect of the individual home owner‟s well-being, the effects 
on stable family life or the positive impact on communities – have become socially 
embedded.
56
  However, on the other hand, it has been suggested that the key housing issue in 
contemporary Britain, and for the foreseeable future, is the sustainability – rather than the 
expansion – of home ownership.57  The widespread availability of cheap credit for house 
purchases has meant that the proportion of home owners with low incomes has increased 
dramatically.  In fact, 32% of those classed as „poor‟ in the UK are owner occupiers subject 
to a mortgage.
 58
  Furthermore, since low-income households are at greatest risk of default, it 
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has been argued that the risks associated with home ownership – especially those associated 
with health and family life
59
 - must be re-evaluated in the context of poverty research.
60
  The 
range of economic and social issues associated with mortgage possession actions and low-
income households support the argument that the strict protection of creditor‟s rights should 
be analysed not merely in terms of creditor availability, but in relation to overall market 
efficiency, including the rates of default and the costs associated with default and 
enforcement of security.   
The issues associated with the expansion of the home ownership sector are considered 
further in Chapter Five, while the costs of possession actions are discussed below.  Although 
there are undoubtedly significant benefits to be reaped from home ownership, some 
households find owner occupation unsustainable, which leads to default, repossession and 
major economic, social and emotional losses.  For these households, it is arguable that their 
interests would be better served by encouraging creditors to act as effective gate-keepers, and 
to follow responsible lending practices, rather than focusing exclusively on lending volume.  
This has repercussions for legal analysis which purports to assert that high creditor 
protections are, „at the end of the day‟, in the interests of the consumer.  It is also worth 
bearing in mind that when creditors are highly protected against default, there is less 
incentive for them to negotiate, restructure and reschedule payments with defaulting debtors. 
So far as the economic argument is concerned, it is clear that the position is more 
complex than the apparently simplistic admonition that „money will not be lent‟, or „at the 
end of the day it is the borrower that pays‟.  However, even if these axioms concerning the 
consequences of reducing the degree of creditor protection could be substantiated by 
empirical evidence, this would not necessarily be the end of the story.  Perhaps, for those who 
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persist in valuing the availability of credit over and above other – including other economic - 
considerations,
61
 the task of conceptualising home may remain meaningless.  In fact, from 
this perspective, the conceptual underdevelopment of home rather accommodates the 
continued pre-eminence of the creditor‟s interests.  However, the validity of adopting a pure 
economic efficiency approach is in itself questionable when viewed from a broader 
perspective.  Bearing in mind that, historically, the promotion of homeownership was not 
purely driven by market considerations but was also significantly influenced by socio-cultural 
goals,
62
 the suggestion that law‟s response to creditor/occupier disputes should be rooted only 
in economic cost/benefit analysis, without taking account of other considerations, is 
anomalous.  This is particularly pertinent in light of the current movement, in a range of 
disciplines, to re-evaluate market practices from more social perspectives.
63
  The next section 
will consider some of the considerations that might be taken into account when pursing such 
an avenue of inquiry.   
 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON STRIKING THE BALANCE  
 
Notwithstanding the complexity of the issues surrounding the provision of credit for home 
ownership, the „efficiency model‟ that appears to have influenced the current pro-creditor 
stance when determining disputes between creditors and occupiers appears concerned with 
only one aspect of the socio-economic context of conflicts involving home – that is, the 
availability of credit.  Furthermore, as the discussion in Chapter Two has demonstrated, there 
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is little evidence that other factors – either in relation to economic efficiency, or non-
economic factors - are taken into account when the court is balancing the home interests of 
occupiers against the commercial claims of creditors.   
The previous section has suggested that the issue of credit availability is only one of 
the factors that should be regarded as relevant to any economic analysis of the 
creditor/occupier context.  This section moves beyond that position, to discuss the broader 
notion of economic efficiency which has implicitly underwritten the pro-creditor stance 
adopted in legal discourse.  The constraints that characterise narrowly framed economic 
analysis – particularly the overwhelmingly privileged status conferred on market efficiency 
relative to other goals - have attracted criticism from various quarters.  As Quigley has argued 
in the housing context, even where economic efficiency can be established: „many find the 
efficient outcome unpalatable.‟64  The following sections consider some of the theoretical 
analyses underpinning the proposition that legal discourse should look beyond a simple 
efficiency analysis of credit transactions, to take account of wider „justice‟ and „social values‟ 
considerations.   
 
‘Law and market economy’ 
The proposition that „there‟s more to it than efficiency‟ has attracted considerable attention 
from critical economic theorists in recent years.  For example, the „law and market economy‟ 
school
65
 argues that, while economic efficiency is one factor which can be taken into account 
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when thinking about law, law‟s concerns go beyond economic efficiency to include 
considerations of justice, fairness and morality; consequently, exchanges cannot be viewed 
purely in terms of efficiency maximisation, but must also be embedded in social and 
community values.  Applying this reasoning to the context of creditor/occupier conflicts over 
the home, it could be argued that the non-economic preferences of occupiers – their practical, 
psychological, social, cultural and even emotional interests in their homes – are significant 
values that should be taken into account when determining the legal issues at stake, even 
though such interests are not readily translatable into monetary value.  Thus, it is argued that 
while issues pertaining to the availability of credit and the interests of creditors are certainly 
relevant to the balancing of creditors‟ and occupiers‟ claims, there are also other 
considerations to be brought to bear.  One inherent difficulty, however, is the very nature of 
these „other‟ considerations.  Since „home interests‟ are inherently intangible, and to date 
have not been enumerated or analysed within a legal framework, a dual difficulty arises.  For 
one thing, in order to justify the development of a concept of home in the context of 
creditor/occupier disputes, it is necessary to demonstrate that there is a „case to answer‟ for 
tempering the protection of creditors‟ interests with other values.  However, without 
unpacking the meanings of home and analysing the occupiers‟ various interests within 
alternative legal frameworks, it is difficult to represent such claims in terminology that is 
recognisable to economists – or indeed to lawyers.   
In Law and Market Economy,
66
 Malloy critiqued the traditional law and economics 
movement for: „…borrow[ing] too heavily from positive economics without acknowledging 
that the tools and methods of economics are directed at a different „end‟ than that of law.‟67  
Malloy particularly emphasised the fact that: „The assumptions of the economist embody 
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certain subjective choices concerning what gets measured and valued and what is ignored or 
excluded‟;68 with the result that the conclusions reached: „…reflect these assumptions and 
constraints.‟69  Where traditional economic analysis regards money as: „…a symbolic sign or 
representation of all values‟;70 Malloy argues that:  
…money…can only represent value in some respects, not in all respects.  Money 
cannot express or interpret all social values and, therefore, it cannot be a universal 
medium for perfect exchange and substitution.  For example, money cannot 
meaningfully capture important environmental values, the value of child bearing and 
child rearing, nor can it capture social values such as love, affection, and respect.  Yet, 
we know these values are important to many communities.
71
    
The dichotomy that Malloy is seeking to demonstrate is clearly evident in the 
creditor/occupier context.  While the creditor‟s interest is easily quantifiable in money terms, 
the occupier‟s interest in retaining the property for use and occupation as a home, although 
undoubtedly „of value‟, is less readily calculable.   
The outcome of legal balancing exercises between the commercial claims of creditors 
and the home interests of occupiers is also consistent with Malloy‟s theory that failure to 
recognise non-financial values: „…privileges the value of those things that are more easily 
quantifiable while conventionalising the habit of assuming the superiority of highly 
monetized relationships.‟72  This effect can be clearly observed in the context of conflicts 
between the readily quantifiable commercial claims of creditors and the non-financial 
interests of occupiers in retaining their home for use and occupation as a home.  Malloy 
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argues that in order for economic analysis to remain useful and relevant, it must be tempered 
with other values, including moral, social and political interests.
73
  Applying this line of 
reasoning to the context of the creditor/occupier dispute, it is readily apparent that the 
currently prevailing pro-creditor bias in English law cannot be justified in the absence of 
some attempt to unpack and to conceptualise the occupier‟s home interests.  Only once this 
process has been carried out, can the court legitimately claim to balance the competing 
interests at stake.   
 
Feminist economics and the ‘masculinity’ of land law  
The ordering of economic analysis around the discourse of efficiency, to the overwhelming 
exclusion of other criteria of economic (and other type of) well-being, has also been criticised 
by feminist economic theorists.  Feminist economic analysis seeks to challenge the claim to 
neutrality and objectivity that characterises neoclassical economics.  While law and 
economics scholars emphasise the purported neutrality of their pursuit of efficiency, feminist 
economic analysis seeks to re-cast traditional market economy as sexually-specific and its 
basic unit of analysis – the „rational economic man‟ – as masculine in gender.  Aspects of 
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feminist economic analysis shed interesting light on the current treatment of the 
creditor/occupier conflict in English law.   
Firstly, from a feminist perspective the lack of attention given to the argument on 
behalf of the occupier in legal disputes involving creditors can be attributed, in part, to the 
apparent subjectivity – and therefore „femininity‟ - of the occupier‟s home interest.  One of 
the hurdles that stand in the path of developing a legal concept of home is the idea that 
„home-type‟ interests are anathema to legal reasoning.  Indeed, home is an essentially 
subjective phenomenon.  It does not appear to be easily quantifiable, and the value of the 
„home‟ interest is not readily susceptible to legal proof.  These characteristics have led the 
court to dismiss the idea of home in law as: „…something ethereal, floating in the air, 
unconnected to bricks and mortar and land.‟74  Furthermore, home interests are not generic, 
but vary from one context to another.  Empirical research has established that not all 
occupiers value their homes in the same way.  Different individuals may have different levels 
of attachment to their properties.  For instance, Wikstrom‟s research indicated that while: 
„[i]n some cases these bonds [to the home] seemed to be so strong, that breaking them by 
moving would lead to disaster [while] [f]or some young people, the flat was just a place 
where they slept and stored their belongings.‟75  Indeed, as Hoffman J acknowledged in Re 
Citro, when balancing the commercial interests of creditors against the home interests of 
occupiers: „[i]t is very hard to see how they can be weighed against each other, except in a 
way which involves some value judgment on the part of the tribunal.‟76      
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These characteristics present obvious impediments when it comes to assessing the 
balance to be struck between creditors and occupiers, from a law and economics perspective.  
However, feminist critics argue that while traditional economic analysis seeks to avoid: 
„…areas where strong normative interests are at stake‟;77 it is important to recognise that 
these interests are both relevant and significant, since: „…economic analyses that explicitly 
recognise the values they embody are more honest and objective than analyses that make 
claims of value-free neutrality‟78  Furthermore, feminist economic thought claims to provide 
the tools by which to broaden the scope of economic analysis, and take account of the full 
range of interests at stake in any given context, as: 
…issues…that are often seen to be too value-laden by traditional economists are 
viewed as legitimate areas of inquiry by feminist economists who accept that 
economic questions involve values and value-judgments.
79
 
Yet, even looking beyond the mere question of subjectivity per se, feminist economic thought 
is particularly pertinent to the legal recognition of home interests, specifically when balanced 
against the commercial claims of creditors.       
It is interesting to note that the prioritisation of the commercial claims of creditors 
involves the elevation of their „objective‟, rational, measurable and easily quantifiable 
interests, over and above what are perceived as the more „subjective‟, irrational, emotional 
and intangible interests of occupiers in their homes.  This can also be constructed as the 
prioritisation of (what are perceived to be) „masculine‟ traits over (what are perceived to be) 
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„feminine‟ values.80  The weight attached to the security interests of creditors, and the lack of 
exposition regarding the home interests of occupiers provide an apt illustration of law‟s 
tendency to favour the „rational‟ interests of „economic man‟.81  Nelson provided a vivid 
illustration of the contrast between the interests at stake in her description of the „Cartesian 
model of objectivity‟, as: „…the abstract, general, detached, emotionless, „masculine‟ 
approach taken to represent scientific thinking…radically removed from, and clearly viewed 
as superior to, the concrete, particular, embodied, passionate, „feminine‟ reality of material 
life…‟82  Nelson‟s observations about the way in which „masculine‟ and „feminine‟ interests 
are ordered is clearly reflected in the conflict between the commercial claims of creditors and 
the home interests of occupiers.  While the creditor‟s claim to the abstract capital asset 
represented by the property can be characterised as masculine, rational, easily quantifiable, 
„knowable‟, the material concerns associated with using and occupying the property as a 
home can be construed as a „feminine‟ interest.  The ethos of legal policy, which recognises 
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and elevates the creditor‟s claim while underrating, if not totally overlooking the occupier‟s 
home interest, is wholly consistent with the model set out in Nelson‟s analysis.83     
If neoclassical economics is primarily concerned with rational individual choices, 
competitive markets, market efficiency, and abstract scientific reasoning, it has much in 
common with the central tenets of English land law.  The distinction set out above – between 
„masculine‟ and „feminine‟ interests – and the ordering of abstract, rational claims over 
material and subjective interests – is clearly reflected in the description of land law as 
aspiring to the status of a „rational science‟.  Although law, as a system created by human 
beings to regulate human conduct, cannot be an exact science, the aim of developing a system 
which will be closely analogous to the „hard sciences‟ is most evident in the field of land law.  
English land law has been described by leading commentators as: 
…display[ing] many of the features of a closed system of logic or an autopoietic 
order, prompting immediate analogies with mathematics and, more particularly, with 
the discipline of Euclidean geometry…every strategic move is dictated by an 
arbitrarily predetermined set of foundational principles…property in land „behaves‟ in 
a manner just as predictable and verifiable as any other branch of rational science.
84
  
Although this apparently strict rationality cannot be absolute, and must sometimes be 
mediated by other values, Gray & Gray argue that the extrinsic values brought to bear in 
contexts such as mortgage (or landlord) possession actions also favour commercial interests 
rather than „home-type‟ interests.85  In relation to dealings between creditors and occupiers, 
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they identify a rhetoric within which: „…relationships are strictly commercial, bargaining is 
hard-nosed, social bondings are minimal and the value attached to land is primarily, perhaps 
even exclusively, an „exchange value‟.  Altruism is in very short support; we are talking 
money.‟86  Thus, not only does the central core of strict logic and rationality in (property) law 
tend to favour the objectively measurable (in money terms) interests of creditors, over and 
above the subjective, intangible, non-financial „home‟ interests of occupiers, but the values 
by which this rationality is tempered also tend towards the financial interests of commercial 
parties rather than the non-financial, social, psychological or emotional „home‟ claims of 
occupiers. 
There is a clear resonance between the disciplines of neoclassical economics and 
English land law.  This is also reflected in critical analyses – particularly feminist critique – 
of both disciplines.  For example, when Green examined the pursuit of a „scientific‟ approach 
in land law, she identified the characteristics outlined above – the association with 
mathematics, the preference for abstract, rational claims - as typically „masculine‟.  In fact, 
Green stated that: 
Of all academic pigeonholes, property law (and its exemplar, land law) is the epitome 
of a masculine knowledge.  It is perceived as one of the most difficult core subjects, 
one of the most rigorous, that requires a love of maths, an aptitude for chess; the 
abstract play of interests in land is a war-game for minds.
87
 
The parallel with neoclassical economics is emphasised in Green‟s suggestion that:   
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The rules maintain their logic and predictability for rational men; distance and a 
certain ruthlessness are also persuasive of land law‟s masculine world view…All the 
rules are judged rationally, according to their fitness for their purpose: the test is 
whether they render the market more or less efficient.
88
 
The significance of this ethos in respect of the creditor/occupier context is evident.  The 
prioritisation of commercial interests, such as the creditor‟s interest in the secured home as 
capital - over and above the use value of the home to occupiers - is clearly facilitated by the 
apparent masculinity of land law‟s self-identity.  On the one hand, it is clear that values 
associated with „the market‟, and so, by extension, with reason and rationality, are lauded,89 
while, on the other hand, non-economic interests are cast as „non-legal‟, and consequently 
dismissed.
90
   
When considering the role of gender in legal discourse, the „masculinity‟ of the 
creditor‟s commercial claim provides a perfect foil to the „femininity‟ of the occupier‟s home 
interest.  Yet, the significance of critical feminist analysis, when applied in this context, goes 
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beyond the specific outcome in possession actions.  Rather, it is indicative of the more 
general difficulties associated with developing a concept of home in law.  While commercial 
interests „fit‟ readily into the framework of interests that are recognised by property law, the 
relationship between an occupier and his or her home, inherently intangible and difficult to 
define, is not readily comprehensible to lawyers.  Legal analysis, particularly in the field of 
property law, tends to favour the rational, the objective, and the tangible:
91
 interests which 
conform to the „hard nosed‟ masculinity of land law.  The proposition that a property may be 
meaningful, in a social, psychological and emotional way, is totally at odds with these types 
of values.  Furthermore, this incongruence has become increasingly marked, as land law has 
been „bureaucratised‟, from the introduction of title registration in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, through the 1925 legislation, and most recently in the Land Registration 
Act 2002.  The link between home interests and the philosophy of „dwelling‟ is explored in 
Chapter Four.  The concept of „dwelling‟ as the way in which humans live in the world laid 
the foundations for an understanding of home as: „an emotionally based and meaningful 
relationship between dwellers and their dwelling places.‟92  However, the bureaucratisation of 
land law has caused a decisive shift in the frame of reference underpinning ownership and 
occupation of land.        
This is clearly evident in the philosophy of the Land Registration Act 2002.  The Land 
Registration Act 2002 has altered the landscape of land law in several major respects.  In 
their seminal textbook, Gray & Gray state that: 
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There has always been an instinctive bias in favour of transactional certainty in the 
land market and this perceived imperative has now acquired a heightened emphasis 
with the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002.  By various means this 
legislation infuses a new quality of rationality into dealings with land…The 2002 Act 
accordingly oversees an intensified system of almost universal recordation of property 
rights in the Land Register, thereby sharpening up the effects of dealings between 
strangers and reducing potential threats to any title taken by a transferee or 
mortgagee.
93
     
Before the development of title registration, possession was the root of title in land.  The 
significance of possession in the theoretical framework of property law is considered further 
in Chapter Six.  According to the common law tradition, physical possession was the basis 
for presumptive ownership, rather than abstract title.   
The material fact of possession was the basis for the doctrine of seisin, a principle 
which: „…expressed the organic element in the relationship between man and land and as 
such provided presumptive ownership within the medieval framework of rights in land.‟94  As 
Alice Ehr-Soon Tay wrote in 1978: 
…it is because all proprietary and possessory rights ultimately stem from enjoyment 
that seisin lies at the very root of the development of the English law of property and 
of the Englishman‟s concept of freedom – of his home as his castle.  The common 
law, then, begins with and long maintains a bias in favour of the factual situation – the 
citizen‟s actual behaviour and powers against the claims or privilege and authority as 
such…The role of the underlying seisin-possession concept in the common law is to 
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recognise and protect those still important areas in which men live, work and plan as 
users…95 
This account of the significance of possession in the common law tradition of land law 
highlighted the weight that was attached to the material fact of dwelling on land, of living and 
using and occupying the property.   
The shift away from this type of system is associated with the introduction of title 
registration.  As the system of title registration has developed, and particularly with the 
enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002, it has affected a shift in emphasis: „…from 
possession to title, from empirically defined fact to state-defined entitlement, from property 
as a reflection of social actuality to property as a product of state-ordered or political fact.  In 
short, instead of the citizen telling the state who owns land, the state will henceforth tell the 
citizen.‟96  Even prior to the enactment of the 2002 Act, Green identified the trend of 
bureaucratisation in land law, and suggested that it was significant in signalling: „…a 
distancing from the material and subjectively known (feminine) place to an intellectual and 
objective (masculine) space.‟97   
The particular implications of gendered perceptions of home values are explored in 
greater depth in Chapter Eight, which unpacks the development of feminist legal theory with 
regards to the concept of home, and analyses the ambiguities of home for feminist 
commentators against empirical studies concerning the meaning and values of home and the 
experiences of mortgage possession for men and women.  Green has argued that women‟s 
interests in land have often been „invisible‟, as: „…there are no official statistics on the 
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ownership of land by women, or on the value of their shares in land, their dispossessions or 
evictions.‟98  Although there is a dearth of quantitative data on issues concerning women and 
property ownership within the land law system, Chapter Eight will draw on qualitative 
analysis, across a range of other disciplines, on the significance of gender in the 
creditor/occupier context.  Chapter Eight will also consider the ambiguities surrounding the 
idea of the home as a meaningful and significant place for women occupiers.   
Feminist theorists have traditionally rejected the idea of the „home‟ as place for 
women, due to the connotations that this concept has traditionally had with patriarchy, 
domination and the confinement of women to the private sphere.  Feminist critics have 
described „home‟, particularly when associated with the idea of „women in the home‟, as a 
prison, a place of patriarchy and oppression,
99
 and in extreme cases a place of violence.
100
  
Home is represented as the paradigmatic „private‟ sphere, which both practically and 
emblematically assists the patriarchal endeavour of keeping women invisible to the law, 
vulnerable to abuse, and without access to public power.  When conceived within this 
framework, Valerie Burks argued that feminists must reject home, since: „[f]rom its very 
beginnings, feminism has, in large part, sought to expose the separation of public and private 
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life as a mere fabrication of phallo-centric power structures meant to quell woman‟s political 
identity and „keep her at home‟.‟101   
The association between women and the „home as private sphere‟ are also significant 
in relation to critical law and economics analysis of the creditor/occupier contest.  The 
public-private dimension provides another layer of gender differentiation, and demonstrates 
once again the elevation of that which is perceived to be „masculine‟.  The commercial 
interests of the creditor are associated with the market – a public arena – and therefore 
„masculine‟, while the home – a private space – is associated with „femininity‟.  Furthermore, 
as Green & Lim asserted: „…the difference matters, because the public is economically and 
politically more important than the private.‟102  This dichotomy is brought into sharp relief 
when analysing credit transactions secured against the home – particularly the family home.  
When home interests are defeated by creditor actions, the outcome can be characterised as: 
„…private actions in the family home…being judged by public values – rationality over 
altruism, competition over co-operation, individual over community, men over women.‟103  
Of course, the interests of occupiers encompass financial interests as well as non-economic 
values, but it is „x‟-factor104 that transforms a house into a home - the social, psychological, 
emotional responses that create attachments to home – that renders „home-oriented‟ 
arguments vulnerable, since the proposition that home can encapsulate meanings beyond the 
physical structure of the house, or the capital value it represents, continues to present 
conceptual difficulties for lawyers.   
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The stark conflict between creditors and occupiers is emphasised once again since, 
while the „home‟ interest is perceived as „feminine‟, equally so the creditor‟s action to realise 
the capital value of the property is regarded as a „masculine‟ act.  Rosemary Auchmuty has 
contrasted the perception of non-economic home values as „important to most women‟ with: 
„…the masculine concern for business profits.‟105  The significance, from a gender 
perspective, of the automatic priority afforded to creditors in actions against domestic 
property, is patent.  Yet, gender is not the only issue at stake.  Rather, as Kate Green has 
suggested, the (effectively) automatic prioritisation of the claims of creditors over the 
interests of occupiers reflects the way in which the: „…needs of property owners, self-
interested and rational individuals in the market place, override the needs of those who are 
different: weaker or poorer, or in a different way defined as Other.‟106  This proposition has 
been borne out in the repossession context by numerous empirical studies, which have 
demonstrated both the salience of home for certain categories of occupier – whether because 
of low-income;
107
 age - both for children
108
 and the elderly;
109
 disability;
110
 race;
111
 or marital 
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status
112
 - as well as their heightened vulnerability in relation to possession actions.  Saegert‟s 
research has suggested that when a person‟s economic and social resources are limited, home 
and the neighbourhood environment play a critical role in that person‟s life chances and 
identity.
113
  Yet, paradoxically, it would seem that those who stand to gain significantly from 
the individual economic and social/psychological („x factor‟) advantages purportedly 
associated with home ownership,
114
 are most vulnerable to repossession and forced sale at the 
hands of a creditor.
115
  Those who have the most to lose in terms of home interest are also 
most likely to find the „dream‟ of home ownership turning into a nightmare.    
It is clear that, although legal policy in creditor/occupier disputes has been heavily 
influenced by the economic clout of creditors, when balancing the arguments for and against 
ordering possession and sale of a home, the current justifications are inadequate.  The 
argument that, since the extension of homeownership depends on the availability of credit 
then creditors‟ rights must prevail, suggests that the issues at stake are straightforward and 
simplistic and that the necessary outcome is obvious.  Creditors must be protected, and the 
home interests of occupiers must be dismissed.  The discussion above has attempted to 
unpack some of the complex issues in play in this context, and to argue that economic 
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efficiency, based on the costs to the creditor, is neither the only option for legal policy makers 
nor, necessarily, the obvious choice.  The pro-creditor bias that dominates legal discourse 
concerning creditor/occupier contests is heavily value laden, and neither the issues at stake, 
nor the full range of costs, have been taken into account in reaching that position.      
Furthermore, even if the balancing exercise was envisaged purely in terms of an 
economic cost-benefit analysis, there are other economic costs to consider alongside the 
potential losses to the creditor in the event of default.  In Home Ownership in a Risk 
Society,
116
 Ford, Burrows & Nettleton identified several socio-economic consequences 
resulting from mortgage arrears and repossessions, including financial costs - from outright 
losses to costs resulting from the physical deterioration of property - to the social and 
psychological costs associated with housing debt, restricted residential mobility and 
relationship difficulties, as well as health related costs, and administrative costs.  These costs, 
it was argued, may be experienced by a range of actors: borrowers, lenders, insurers, central 
government, local government, housing market institutions, labour market institutions, and 
health services.
117
  In addition, there may be potential costs to existing homeowners and to 
creditors if homeownership were to become less popular.  These considerations provide a 
further challenge to the presumption that appears to have taken hold in the legal domain, that 
an economic analysis of creditor/occupier disputes can be swiftly executed by identifying and 
elevating one element of the equation – the idea that by protecting commercial interests, legal 
policy makers can safeguard the flow of capital into housing.  While this solution may satisfy 
the interests of individual creditors or landlords, in the long term the ultimate question of 
„who pays‟ is much more complex.  If consequentialist economic analysis is the justification 
for allowing commercial interests to routinely outweigh home interests, then there is 
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currently no indication that all the potential costs - financial and non-financial - have been 
taken into account.   
 
THE IMPACT OF LOSING A HOME: FROM THE PERSONAL TO THE POLITICAL   
 
The context of disputes between creditors and occupiers provides a stark example of the way 
in which the values of home to an occupier are actually minimised, especially when weighed 
against the more tangible claims of creditors, despite the fact that the net result for the 
occupier, if the creditor‟s claim to the house as security prevails, is often the loss of their 
home.  One of the issues associated with the arguments surrounding the impact of losing a 
home, however, reflects an obstacle frequently encountered when dealing with „home-type‟ 
issues – that is, both the apparent subjectivity of home attachments, and the difficulty in 
subjecting the personal impact of creditors‟ possession actions on occupiers to legal proof.  
As one home theorist has suggested in another context: „…the problem lies with the fact that 
we are dealing with environmental intangibles – attachment, grief, loss – which are 
immeasurable, difficult to articulate, and thus easy to ignore by the cost-benefit brigade.‟118  
In one sense, the impact of losing one‟s home can only ever be quantified after the event, 
since: „[b]eing intangible, qualities of home are often only identified when they are lost.‟119  
Thus, as Buttimer suggested:  
Whether all these values are consciously articulated in legal or behavioural terms does 
not seem to be the crucial point.  In fact, they are often not brought to consciousness 
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until they are threatened: normally they are part of the fabric of everyday life and its 
taken for granted routines.
120
   
Not only do home values become more easily identifiable when the occupier‟s relationship 
with the home is threatened, but the argument that home interests are significant and should 
be protected is brought into sharp relief when creditors bring actions against the property, and 
the occupier faces the loss of their home.   
Empirical studies which have focused on the psychological impact of losing one‟s 
home identify extreme responses including alienation and grief amongst dispossessed 
occupiers.
121
  In Brown and Perkins‟ study of disruptions in place attachment, they found 
that: „After the development of secure place attachments, the loss of normal attachments 
creates a stressful period of disruption followed by a post-disruption phase of coping with lost 
attachments and creating new ones.‟122  Similarly, in „Grieving for a Lost Home‟, Marc Fried 
considered the crisis of losing one‟s home and concluded that: „…for the majority it seems 
quite precise to speak of their reactions as expressions of grief.‟123  Victims of home loss 
reported a range of responses, including:  
feelings of painful loss, the continued longing, the general depressive tone, frequent 
symptoms of psychological or social or somatic distress, the active work required in 
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adapting to the altered situation, the sense of helplessness, the occasional expressions 
of both direct and displaced anger, and tendencies to idealise the lost place.
124
 
The dramatic nature of the occupier‟s response to losing his or her home is consistently 
evident across the literature.  For example, Fried described the effect of forced relocation as: 
„…a crisis with potential danger to mental health…‟125  Indeed, Fried‟s views regarding the 
detrimental health consequences of losing one‟s home have been legitimated by several 
recent studies into the impact of loss of home on mental and physical health.  The evidence 
that has emerged from research studies on this question, particularly in the context of 
mortgage possession actions, is considered further below.  
Although the experience of losing one‟s home will vary from one occupier to another, 
there is sufficient evidence of the generally negative effects of home loss to indicate that: 
„[g]rieving for a lost home is evidently a widespread and serious social phenomenon.‟126  
Fried‟s 1963 research, which focused on the context of urban slum clearage, suggested that 
the most extreme responses to losing one‟s home – either negative or positive – were likely to 
arise in only a minority of cases.  He claimed that the experience of home loss was: „…likely 
to increase social and psychological „pathology‟ in a limited number of instances; and it is 
also likely to create new opportunities for some, and to increase the rate of social mobility for 
others.‟127  In the majority of cases, however, the effects of dispossession were negative, 
albeit less extreme.  Fried argued that: „[f]or the greatest number, dislocation is unlikely to 
have either effect but does lead to intense personal suffering despite moderately successful 
adaptation to the total situation of relocation.‟128        
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Another study, which examined the effects on occupiers of losing their homes 
because they were to be demolished, also supported the argument that the repossessed 
occupier experiences a sense of loss that cannot be redressed by simply relocating that 
occupier, or family, in another housing environment.
129
  Porteous claimed that: „…domicide 
has negative social and psychological effects on its human victims‟;130 regardless of whether 
the occupier‟s shelter needs were met in another way.  The significant factor for the occupiers 
was forced relocation from their homes.  The research indicated that: „[c]hange almost 
invariably involves loss, and bereavement-like symptoms of grief are common among those 
uprooted and relocated.‟131  It is particularly interesting to note that Porteous related this grief 
to the loss of the particular property with which the occupier had a „home relationship‟, since 
even where the occupiers were moved to properties that could be regarded as objectively 
superior, they were found to: „…pay for this in terms of considerable social and 
psychological disruption.‟132   
These studies are relevant to analysis of the occupier‟s home interest, and to the legal 
concept of home, since both Fried and Porteous were concerned with the consequences, for 
the occupier, when they were involuntarily dispossessed.  However, some factors distinguish 
the situations examined in these studies from the context of creditor possession actions.  For 
one thing, in both studies, the „domicide‟ to which the authors referred involved the 
destruction of whole neighbourhoods for the purposes of planning or urban development.  
While this obviously affected the individual occupiers of homes within those neighbourhoods 
– and the focus of both analyses was on the personal responses of the dispossessed occupiers 
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– these situations differ somewhat from the loss of home through mortgage possession 
actions.  For one thing, in the neighbourhood cases, the dispossessed occupiers may be less 
susceptible to feelings of guilt and shame compared to repossessed occupiers.  For occupiers 
who lose their homes following default on a debt, there may be a greater feeling of 
responsibility for the predicament than for those who are dispossessed, like their neighbours, 
as part of a wider development strategy.  In addition, while the cases involving „domicide‟ 
affected whole communities, the occupier who loses their home through repossession is more 
likely to find the experience isolating relative to the wider community.   
Yet, statistical research has indicated that while the volume of creditor possession 
actions has stabilised since the last major recession in the early 1990s, a range of economic 
factors have meant that the „normal‟ level of risk associated with mortgage debt have 
increased significantly.
133
  The economic context of home ownership in the early twentieth 
century is considered further in Chapter Five.  While the political, social and cultural 
ideologies of home ownership remain deeply embedded amongst British citizens, the 
economic experience of home ownership has been affected by a range of systemic factors.  
These have included the expansion of home ownership, particularly low-income home 
ownership, but without adequate governmental support; demographic transformations, 
particularly in the shape of higher rates of household dissolution and instability; economic 
transformations, particularly in relation to employment practices; and the re-structuring of 
government safety-net provisioning.
134
  The unsustainability of contemporary home 
ownership emphasises the growing incidence of occupiers losing their homes through 
creditor possession actions.  One consequence of this has been an increase in academic 
interest concerning the effects of repossession on occupiers.  The following section considers 
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some of the empirical research carried out in recent years concerning the impact of 
possession actions on home occupiers.  This research casts an interesting light on any 
evaluation of the „costs‟ of creditor protections, both economic and non-economic.     
 
Losing one’s home through creditor possession actions 
While loss of home is indeed a subjective experience, the negative (or positive) effects of 
which will vary from case to case, there appears to be sufficient evidence of the potentially 
adverse effects of dislocation from one‟s home to justify further consideration of the specific 
consequences of loss of home through creditor possession actions when evaluating the 
broader policy context of creditor/occupier disputes.  One useful source in this regard is Ford, 
Burrows and Nettleton‟s qualitative study of the experiences and perceptions of 30 families 
with children following mortgage repossession.
135
  This social analysis adopted a wide 
ranging perspective in relation to the costs of mortgage arrears and possession actions.  
Alongside analysis of the economic factors that have rendered home ownership 
unsustainable, this study classified the potential range of costs associated with mortgage 
arrears and possessions, to demonstrate how the impact of possession actions is embedded in 
society.  These costs are experienced by a range of actors, including borrowers and lenders, 
but also extending to include insurers, central government, local government, housing market 
institutions, labour market institutions and health services.  It is suggested that the impact on 
non-debtor occupiers sharing a home with the borrower could be added to this list.   
 Ford et al classify these costs as social, social psychological, health, administrative, 
financial, political and organisational.  For example, lenders and insurers endure the social 
costs of loss of trust when debtors fall into default and actions for possession are brought.  
Housing market institutions experience the social psychological cost of reduced confidence in 
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the sector, while insurers and the labour market may experience health-related costs through 
increased risk of accident claims and employee absenteeism.  Parties affected by 
administrative costs include the lender, who must invest resources in pursuing the debt and 
bringing an action for default; central government, through arrangements for the payment of 
ISMI (income support for mortgage interest);
136
 local government, through increased demand 
for homelessness provision; and the health services, who are liable to face additional demand 
for services.  The financial costs are particularly widespread, affecting almost all of the 
parties identified.  The creditor, obviously, faces the prospect of real financial losses, but the 
borrower also faces a range of financial costs, such as administrative charges from the 
creditor, the burden of residual debt, increased payments and falling into poverty.  Insurers 
face financial costs through payout on mortgage insurance; financial costs for central 
government include payments of ISMI and on „mortgage rescue‟ schemes; local government 
bodies face the financial costs of increased homelessness provision and the provision of 
housing advice.  The housing market is affected by reduced revenue and a fall-off in housing 
transactions when home ownership becomes less popular, while the health services face 
financial costs in respect of additional demand from repossessed occupiers whose mental 
health and well-being are affected by the loss of their homes.
137
   
While financial costs, and administrative or resource costs are readily identifiable, and 
tend to be persuasive both in government policy and legal decision making, it is the social, 
social psychological and health costs visited upon borrowers and other occupiers that are 
more difficult to capture.  Ford et al suggested that the costs of mortgage default and 
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possession actions for borrowers include the social costs of social exclusion, insecurity and 
reduced standards of living; the social psychological costs include experiencing the stigma of 
debt as well as reported relationship difficulties, and that these factors, along with the 
experience of possession itself – which, the study found, led to an increase in feelings of 
sadness, loss and insecurity – could have implications for mental health and well-being.  The 
combination of factors linked to the social, social psychological and health consequences of 
losing one‟s home through creditor possession actions are most readily conveyed by listing 
the range of impacts that emerged from this study.
138
  Ford et al identified consequences 
linked to quality of life; social status and identity; personal and family relationships; future 
aspirations; and health and well being.  These consequences include: 
 
Quality of life 
 Homelessness 
 Loss of lifestyle 
 Poverty 
 Long-term debts 
 Insecure tenancy 
 Social isolation 
 Loss of job 
 Loss of friends 
 Unsuitable accommodation 
 Lack of space 
 Loss of personal possessions 
 No access to credit 
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 Loss of pets 
 
Social status and identity 
 Stigma 
 Humiliation 
 Embarrassment 
 Loss of „owner‟ status 
 Sense of failure 
 Letting family down 
 Loss of confidence 
 Loss of self-esteem 
 Sense of regret 
 Becoming „second class citizens‟ 
 
Personal and family relationships 
 Marital breakdown 
 Relationship tension 
 Split up household 
 Arguments 
 Inability to invest trust in relationships 
 Parenting difficulties 
 
Future aspirations 
 Financial insecurity 
 Fear of the future 
 178 
 Fear can‟t buy again 
 Lost „hopes and dreams‟ 
 No independence 
 Poverty in old age 
 
Health and well-being 
 Poor mental health 
 Poor physical health 
 Depression 
 Stress 
 
Health implications of loss of home through mortgage possession actions  
Mortgage default and repossession are clearly matters of considerable personal stress and 
distress for the occupiers of the home.  One aspect which has attracted considerable attention 
in recent literature is the mental and physical health implications of living with mortgage 
arrears and repossession.
139
  Research on the relationships between housing and health 
indicates that: „…the social, social psychological and health related consequences of 
mortgage possession are both dramatic and overwhelmingly negative.‟140  Characteristics of 
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the experience of arrears and repossession include living with debt, uncertainty and lack of 
control.  Falling into arrears and facing the prospect of repossession is „a stressful life event‟, 
and the social and social-psychological consequences of being in arrears and experiencing 
repossession are thought to: „…help to explain the link between problematic homeownership 
and poor health.‟141   
In their study, Ford, Burrows and Nettleton linked the experience of living with 
mortgage arrears to: „…stress, social isolation, social exclusion and a loss of social status and 
valued identity.‟142  Other features of living with debt included social isolation, strain on 
personal relationships, and a feeling of shame and stigma,
143
 all of which are factors 
associated with poor health.  In addition to this, the prospect of repossession actions was 
recognised as causing considerable stress.  The process of possession actions for the 
borrowers surveyed was characterised by uncertainty, insecurity and lack of control, and this 
exacerbated the adverse health implications of living with debt.
144
  The mortgage possession 
process itself was: „…a long process characterised by uncertainty‟;145 and the outcome was 
influenced by several factors outside the occupier‟s control.146  One study emphasised that: 
„…households were rarely able to plan, or exert any control over the nature and location of 
their post possession housing, and…they found it difficult to exert any control over the 
processes involved in the transition from owner occupation to renting.‟147  Evidence from 
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Christie‟s study also indicated that: „Worry and stress were intensified by going to court for a 
repossession hearing, to the extent that the health and well-being of individual household 
members was affected.‟148  These difficulties may be heightened when the household 
includes children, since: „[h]ouseholds with children were more likely to want to stay put, 
regardless of how they now viewed the house and all the associated financial problems.‟149   
The particular issues that arise in creditor/occupier disputes, when the occupiers are 
custodial parents, or in relation to child occupiers, are considered in more detail in Chapters 
Seven and Nine.  Analysis of the legal response to home interests in these chapters reveals 
that although the discourses of family life and the interests of children are discernible in 
legislative and judicial policies, the extent to which their home interests have influenced the 
outcome of creditor actions for possession and sale has been limited.  In fact, when presented 
with arguments that highlighted the consequences of ordering possession and sale of a family 
home, the court‟s typical response has been that:  
Such circumstances, while engendering a natural sympathy in all who hear of them, 
cannot be described as exceptional. They are the melancholy consequences of debt 
and improvidence with which every civilised society has been familiar.
150
   
It is indeed the case that the circumstances of debt, default and repossession have become 
increasingly familiar in recent decades.  In Home Ownership in a Risk Society,
151
 Ford, 
Burrows and Nettleton discussed the systemic factors that have given rise to „unsustainable 
home ownership‟, including demographic factors, broader economic shifts, for example in the 
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nature of the labour market, the government‟s very successful promotion of home ownership 
across all income groups, and the re-structuring of government safety-net provisions for 
borrowers.  Ford et al identified a link between unsustainable home ownership and 
government policy in housing and in welfare provision for owner occupiers, which supports 
the proposition that, while the experiences of occupiers who lose their homes through creditor 
possession actions may not be  exceptional, the combination of government policies that has 
created this situation, combined with the „public health‟ implications associated with forced 
sale,
152
 render the loss of home through mortgage possession a political issue, rather than a 
merely personal experience.  The political ideology of home ownership presents owner 
occupation, particularly amongst low income households, as an opportunity to accumulate 
wealth, status, and ontological security.  However, studies have indicated that while well-
being – particularly for low-income households – is enhanced by stable, long-term housing, 
regardless of ownership status, the financial and psychological stresses of unsustainable home 
ownership can undermine the potential benefits.
153
  These issues are examined in the context 
of the political ideology of home ownership, in Chapter Five.  
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One of the recurring themes of this book is the way in which the development of a 
legal concept of home in law has been inhibited by law‟s tendency to focus upon the tangible 
entity of the house, as a physical structure and a capital asset, rather than the intangible 
factors that make a house into a home.  Yet, research examining the experience of loss of 
home for occupiers has emphasised the salience of the intangible elements of the home 
interest.  The range of meanings associated with home are analysed in Chapter Four.  
Following the approach adopted in empirical and theoretical analysis in other disciplines, 
home is analysed as house + „x‟.154  The „bricks and mortar‟ of the house as a physical 
structure are recognisable to law, as is the idea of the property as a capital asset.  However, 
the „x‟-factor also represents the social, psychological, emotional and cultural importance of 
the property for the occupiers of the home.  In Chapter Four, these meanings are explored 
under the (relatively loose) headings of home as financial investment; home as physical 
structure; home as territory; home as identity; home as social and cultural unit.  It is 
interesting to note that research examining psychological responses to „home‟ has never 
shown the common assumption to be true: that the physical structure of home is its most 
important aspect.
155
  The multi-disciplinary findings discussed in Chapter Four support the 
proposition that it is the intangible meanings of home – which are currently dismissed as 
incomprehensible in legal analysis – that are most significant for the people who live in these 
properties.     
This analysis is consistent with empirical analysis into the experience of mortgage 
possession actions for occupiers.  In fact, when investigating the relationship between loss of 
home through repossession actions and the impact on the occupier‟s psycho-social well-
being, Ford, Burrows and Nettleton argued that it is the disruption caused to the „x‟-factor 
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values – the social, psychological, emotional and cultural attachments that the occupier has 
with the property – that are most damaging.  Although the „tangible‟ dimensions of losing 
one‟s home - including the loss of financial investment as well as the practicalities of losing 
one‟s shelter - are, of course, significant when it comes to considering the effects of loss of 
home,
156
 the findings of this study supported the argument that:  
losing a home in this way means more than that to most people.  The [re]possession of 
a property constitutes a significant loss of a home that is invested with meaning and 
memories.  Not only that but…the bureaucratic procedures associated with the 
administrative processes of possession mean that people have to endure long periods 
of insecurity and uncertainty.  A whole set of events is set in train that is out of their 
control…according to the psychosocial literature on the social determinants of health 
it is these experiences (uncertainty and lack of control) that are coming to be regarded 
as among the most crucial determinants of poor health in contemporary societies.
157
 
From the occupier‟s perspective: „losing a home through mortgage possession involves more 
than just losing a property.‟ 158   
 
Law and the emotions 
Another factor that has inhibited the development of the legal concept of home has been the 
suspicion that the occupier‟s „home‟ interest is „mere emotion‟, and so irrelevant to legal 
decision making.  Indeed, to many legal scholars the idea that law has an emotional 
dimension: that is, that legal doctrine and decision making is, or should be, influenced by 
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emotional considerations; may seem surprising, to say the least, antithetical or even heretical.  
As students of the law we are taught that law is objective, rational, impartial, that legal 
training teaches one to „put emotions to one side‟ and to adopt purely rational analyses.159  
From this perspective, the idea that emotional responses and analyses might have a role to 
play in law conjures up the spectre of a subjective, irrational and partial system, which is 
anathema to our idea of „what law is‟.  Yet, although much legal analysis is posited on the 
presumption that law is and should be rooted in logic and rational choice, based on fact rather 
than feeling, there are strong arguments to support the relevance of emotions analysis to legal 
processes.
160
   
One of the principal arguments in support of emotional analysis of law can be stated 
quite simply by focusing attention on law as a system by which human actors seek to regulate 
human behaviour.  As Feldman has argued: „[g]iven that law is made by and for people, the 
relatively little attention lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have paid to human psychology 
is surprising.‟161  To a certain extent, analyses linking the proclivities of human nature with 
the law have been at the core of the law and psychology movement.  The growth of interest in 
law and psychology as a branch of legal theory is testament to an acknowledgement, within 
the scholarly community, of the inter-relationships between law and human behaviour.  The 
empirical and scientific findings of psychological scholarship in relation to the meanings of 
home to occupiers have much to offer by way of a conceptual springboard for the 
development of a legal concept of home.   
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However, as the discussion in this chapter has illustrated, the incongruities between 
home analysis, on the one hand, and legal discourse – particularly „property-speak‟ – on the 
other, have frustrated attempts to recognise the meaning of home in law.  As Ward LJ 
declared in Le Foe v Le Foe,
162
 the disputed property had: „…been her home and her 
mother‟s home.  There is a huge emotional investment in it‟;163 yet „…the protection of her 
emotional security is, of course, an interest I cannot protect.‟164  In the first place, the 
introduction of „home‟ analysis - particularly with regard to emotional, psychological, social 
and other attachments - into the legal domain appears to run counter to the presumed 
rationality of the legal system: procedurally fair, treating like cases alike, and thus disinclined 
to attach weight to subjective or emotional factors.
165
  Consequently, the idea of home in law 
has not carried much weight, particularly when balanced against easily measurable, legally 
definable, proprietary and contractual interests in the property.  Furthermore, land law is 
often regarded as the sine qua non of this legal model of rationality, with leading 
commentators characterising it as a „rational science‟ in which: „…the perfection of pure 
reason appears most nearly attainable.  English land law – more obviously than any other area 
of the law…displays many of the features of a closed system of logic…‟166  The idea of home 
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- as an experiential, intangible, if nonetheless real phenomenon – does not sit easily within 
this framework of objectively measurable, clearly definable interests.   
Yet, empirical research on the experience of losing one‟s home through mortgage 
possession actions has established the significance of the occupier‟s emotional reaction to 
repossession, and the tangible negative impact that this emotional trauma can have on the 
occupier‟s physical and mental health.  Research on the sociology of emotions has indicated 
that: „…social events and circumstances can have bodily correlates…‟167  Ford et al have 
characterised the emotional impact of experiencing mortgage possession actions as a „loss of 
emotional capital‟ for the occupier.168  The loss experienced by the occupier is not just the 
loss of a property, but also: „…constitutes a significant loss of a home that is invested with 
meaning and memories.‟169  These aspects of home are considered further in Chapter Four.  
In analysing the potential health implications of losing a home, Ford et al argued that in 
addition to the negative health consequences associated with the stressfulness of arrears and 
repossession: „…it is also an intensely emotional life event that has somatic consequences.‟170  
The emotional impact of losing one‟s home through mortgage possession actions has been 
recognised as a significant element of the experience for the occupier, alongside the social, 
psychological and cultural implications of repossession.  Furthermore, the emotional element 
has been linked to the detrimental health consequences of losing one‟s home.  This is 
particularly significant in relation to the broader economic costs of high creditor protections.  
The financial costs of possession actions are experienced not only by the occupier, but by the 
                                                 
167
 Ford, Burrows & Nettleton, above n57, p163; see P Freund, „The expressive body: a common ground for the 
sociology of emotions and health and illness‟ (1990)12 Sociology of Health and Illness 452; S Williams, 
„“Capitalising” on emotions?  Rethinking the inequalities in health debate‟ (1998)32 Sociology 121.     
168
 Ford, Burrows & Nettleton, above n57, pp163-165. 
169
 Ibid, p163. 
170
 Ibid.   
 187 
health services, which face an increased demand for services, by the labour market, in respect 
of employee absenteeism, and by insurers who must pay out on health insurance or accident 
claims.  The idea that the impact of the action on the occupier‟s emotional well-being can be 
simply dismissed as irrelevant highlights the very narrow outlook that currently prevails in 
legal analysis of the creditor/occupier context.             
Another highly significant aspect of this study was the finding that: „…the likelihood 
of ensuring negative emotional experiences that have detrimental physical effects is greater 
for those who are in socially disadvantaged position.‟171  Another theme of this book is the 
promotion of home ownership, particularly amongst low-income borrowers, as a source of 
social status and ontological security.  Research in the sociology of emotions has indicated 
that the emotional impact of negative experiences is exacerbated for people in less powerful 
positions.  Freund claimed that: 
In general, the threats to ontological security are greater for those in dependent, 
subordinate positions.  The lack of resources to protect oneself or to legitimate oneself 
further contributes to status led insecurity.  Less powerful people face a structurally 
built-in handicap in managing social and emotional information and this handicap 
may contribute to existential fear and anxiety.
172
     
It is interesting to note that when correlating sociological analysis of the experiences of „less 
powerful‟ people against their social analysis of mortgage possession actions, Ford et al shift 
the focus away from „those disadvantaged by social divisions such as gender, ethnicity, class 
and age‟.173  Since the rise of „unsustainable‟ home ownership has been attributed to a range 
of extrinsic factors, including demographic changes and labour market changes, the 
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researchers suggest that: „…people are often „disadvantaged‟ in terms of more situationally 
specific contexts and are disempowered in relation to their experiences with institutions.‟174   
Home ownership can no longer be regarded as: „…simply the domain of the contented 
middle classes.‟175  Rather, broader economic and demographic changes in society have 
rendered many home owners potentially vulnerable to the effects of losing their homes, even 
though they may not traditionally be regarded as „disempowered‟.  However, „situational‟ 
events – unemployment, relationship breakdown, death of a partner – can affect all home 
owners, and for those who fall into default, the consequences are debilitating since: 
…mortgage possession deprives people of an important source of social status; they 
perceive themselves and are perceived by others to have slipped down the housing 
ladder.  They have suffered a biological disruption that demands a reassessment of 
their sense of self.  Furthermore, they are relatively disempowered when they come to 
deal with lenders and local authorities.
176
 
These findings, in conjunction with data concerning the impact of loss of home on mental and 
physical health and well-being have been advanced in support of the argument that, 
combining the potential health consequences of losing one‟s home through mortgage 
possession with the systemic factors that have given rise to concerns about the sustainability 
of home ownership in Britain, have turned the „private matter‟ of default on a debt and the 
execution of the creditor‟s security into a „public health issue‟.177   
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EVALUATION: THE CASE FOR RE-CONSIDERING THE PRO-CREDITOR 
PRESUMPTION 
 
The costs of repossession, which impact not only on dispossessed occupiers, but on the 
various agencies tasked to deal with the repercussions of loss of home - ranging from the 
practical need for shelter to social, psychological and health issues - are complex.  Yet, the 
legal regulation of possession actions in many jurisdictions, including England and Wales, 
has typically allowed little room for consideration of the broader issues at stake.  Rather, 
legal discourse in this context has been dominated by a pro-creditor presumption that has left 
little scope for consideration of alternative arguments or of the wider issues linked to creditor 
possession actions.  There are, obviously, legitimate arguments to support the weight attached 
to the commercial interests of creditors in enforcing their proprietary security interests.  
However, in striking a balance between the interests of creditors and the interests of those 
who occupy the secured property as a home, legal analysis has subjugated the „home‟ 
interests of the occupier to such an extent that they appeared to have become effectively 
irrelevant.  Despite occasional references to the status of the property „as a home‟, at the end 
of the day the creditor always wins.   
 This approach has had significant impact on the treatment of „home‟ interests by legal 
academics.  The dismissal of the home interest in legal practice does little to encourage 
academic analysis of the idea of home in law.  Yet without academic analysis to support 
home-type arguments, the chimera of home interests continues to lurk in the shadows of 
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policy discourse.  Without a conceptual framework within which to comprehend the 
meanings and values of home interests for law, their claims are no match for the economic 
clout of the creditor.  Creditors continue to prevail, and legal understandings of the home 
interest remain underdeveloped.  This chapter has sought to establish an argument for 
breaking that cycle, setting aside the pro-creditor presumption, and investigating the various 
interests at stake in creditor/occupier disputes.  For one thing, it has been suggested that the 
justifications for prioritising creditors‟ claims are based on narrowly defined interpretations 
of contractual obligations, and a model of efficiency that recognises only a limited range of 
economic costs, that is, the financial costs to the creditor.   
 This chapter has sought to demonstrate the complexity of the policy issues 
surrounding creditor/occupier contests.  Not only are there salient issues underlying law‟s 
proclivity towards financial value, over and above other values, but even within a model of 
economic efficiency that measured costs only in terms of financial overheads, creditor 
possession actions bring a range of potential costs, affecting the creditor, the occupier, and 
many other agencies and interested parties, into play.  Of course, this is not to say that, on 
evaluating these factors, the weight legitimately attached to the commercial interests of 
creditors might not still be so great as to outweigh the home-type considerations on the side 
of the occupier.  However, at present, the task of balancing the interests of creditors in the 
capital represented by the property against the claims of occupier to use of the property as a 
home is very much skewed against the occupier, as a result of the underdevelopment of the 
occupier‟s home interest in law.  This book seeks to demonstrate the relevance of home 
interests to legal analysis.  While the outcome of such analysis may not, ultimately, justify 
exempting the home from repossession, or even swinging the balance away from the 
creditors‟ financial claim in all (or many?) cases, the process of legal decision making would 
be more legitimately grounded on a full and clear exposition of the interests at stake.   
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As the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated, one obstacle in the path of this 
analysis is the perception that any argument seeking to displace the weighty status currently 
conferred on creditors‟ interests may appear to be „swimming against the tide‟ in terms of the 
prevailing values of contemporary legal discourse.  However, it is worth bearing in mind that 
there is nothing inherently unworkable about a concept of home in law.  It has been 
recognised that, although the idea of home has not prevailed in mortgage possession contexts 
in recent decades, the idea that a person‟s home amounts to a special type of property has not 
been wholly absent from legal discourse.  In fact, only a few decades ago, leading land law 
commentators anticipated the development of this idea of home in the area of possession 
actions when they suggested that: 
Changing times produce new needs, and one of the foremost claims of the present age 
is the demand for residential security.  Recent developments have witnessed the 
recognition of what is virtually a modern concept of seisin – the idea that the 
possession of the actual occupier of land must be protected.
178
  
This pro-occupier stance was based on the idea that: „[t]he things which are today of real 
value to the man on the street are assets like his job, his pension, and the right to undisturbed 
possession of his home.‟179   
It is interesting to note, with reference to the discussion of unsustainable home 
ownership above, that arguments asserting the importance of residential security in the early 
1980s were linked to concerns about ontological insecurity, resulting from „housing shortage, 
economic recession and an unprecedented rate of family breakdown‟, factors which made it 
„increasingly important to have a secure domestic base.‟180  Gray and Symes even went so far 
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as to suggest that: „…the enjoyment of residential protection in circumstances of adequate 
housing is an essential condition for a life of dignity and purpose…[thus]…for reasons which 
are basically social in origin, residential protection has been conferred upon defined classes 
of deserving citizen‟.181  It is particularly pertinent to note that these social factors were – at 
this time – viewed as capable of giving rise to proprietary rights, and thus potentially 
outweighing the commercial interests of creditors.  The authors claimed that: „[e]ntitlement to 
„use value‟ of property has become more important than entitlement to „exchange value‟ on 
the freehold market.‟182  Yet, following a dramatic shift in housing laws and policies under 
the Thatcher government and after, which prioritised the protection of capital interests to 
encourage lending to home owners and investment in the private rental sector,
183
 the idea of 
protecting the occupied home faded from the legal academic‟s agenda.  
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the tide may be beginning to turn.  For 
example, even in the decision in Re Citro,
184
 which established that in cases involving a 
bankrupt debtor, the court must order sale unless the circumstances of the case are 
exceptional, and that „exceptional‟ circumstances must go beyond: „…the melancholy 
consequences of debt and improvidence with which every civilised society has become 
familiar.‟;185 there was evidence that, given the appropriate tools, the court might have 
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preferred to adopt a less harsh approach towards the occupiers.  Referring to the High Court 
judgment under appeal, Bingham LJ stated that in allowing the occupier‟s home interest to 
prevail, Hoffman J had regarded the existing authorities: „…as entitling or obliging him 
simply to balance the interests of the creditors against those of the wife, the creditors‟ prima 
facie entitlement to their money being simply one element in the scales – and not a 
particularly weighty one at that.‟186  Although Bingham LJ stated that he: „…did not…think 
[this approach] reflects the principle which…clearly emerges from the cases‟;187 he did admit 
that he:  
…would willingly adopt this [more flexible] approach if I felt free to do so.  It is in 
my view conducive to justice in the broadest sense and it reflects the preference which 
the law increasingly gives to personal over property interests.
188
   
While his Lordship was inclined to adopt a more flexible approach, which would allow the 
occupier‟s home interest to be genuinely considered in the balance, he did not consider that 
the precedents permitted such an approach to be taken.  Nonetheless, the implication was that 
there was some element of judicial willingness to redress the balance in favour of the home 
occupier, should such a course of action be justifiable according to authority.   
Another indication that the home interests of occupiers may be creeping back onto the 
agenda in legal analysis of creditor/occupier disputes can be found in the decision in Edwards 
v Lloyd’s TSB Bank.189  The decision in Edwards, which is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Nine, suggested some shift in judicial attitudes, specifically regarding the interests of 
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child occupiers
190
 in the context of orders for sale.  In Edwards, the court refused to grant an 
order for immediate sale under sections 14 and 15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996 (TLATA) on the grounds that it: „…would be unacceptably severe in its 
consequences upon Mrs Edwards and her children.‟191  The court held that sale of the 
property should be postponed for a period of at least five years, when the younger child 
would have reached the age of majority, and when: „…it seems possible that…it will no 
longer be in practice incumbent on Mrs Edwards to provide a home at her expense for her son 
and daughter.‟192  This case provided a relatively rare example of a instance in which the 
outcome of an application for sale was not ordered according to the wishes of the creditor.   
To some extent, this shift in judicial policy change is attributable to the legislative 
context of the decision: the court‟s reasoning was framed by sections 14 and 15 of the Trusts 
of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996: section 14 conferred on the court a 
jurisdiction to order the sale of property held on a trust of land, and replaced the broad 
discretion to order sale under section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925; section 15 set out 
various criteria to be taken into account by the court when considering whether to make an 
order for sale under section 14.  One of the factors to be considered by the court when 
making orders in respect of property held on a trust of land is „the welfare of any minor 
occupiers‟ (section 15(1)(c)).  Nevertheless, and notwithstanding TLATA and the section 15 
criteria, prior to the decision in Edwards, there had been little evidence that the interests of 
children carried sufficient weight to persuade the court to refuse an application for sale, 
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particularly when balanced against the interests of creditors in recouping their capital.
193
  This 
case suggested that, where there was a legitimate statutory basis for recognising the home 
interests of occupiers, the lower courts, at least, may be willing to give effect to that.  
To this end, another significant case was the decision in Barca v Mears,
194
 in which 
the court considered the implications of the obligations set out in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) and given effect by the Human Rights Act 1998, on an application 
for possession and sale made by a trustee in bankruptcy.  Although the court decided, on the 
facts, that there had been no infringement of Mr Barca‟s – or his son‟s – right to respect for 
private and family life and the home under Article 8 of the ECHR, the court did open this up 
as an avenue by which the court‟s overwhelming predisposition towards creditors might be 
challenged.  In Barca v Mears, counsel for the occupier, Mr Barca, argued that an order for 
possession and sale would have detrimental impact on both himself and his minor son - who 
spent a substantial portion of the week living in the house and who was alleged to have 
special educational needs.  Thus, he argued that in granting the order, the Deputy Registrar 
had failed to take account of their right to family life, home and privacy.  Although Mr 
Strauss QC, sitting as Deputy Judge of the High Court, accepted that the rights set out in 
Article 8(1) are not absolute, but qualified by the matters set out in Article 8(2),
195
 he stated 
that, as a matter of human rights law:  
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[c]learly, in many or perhaps most cases, the sale of a bankrupt‟s property in 
accordance with bankruptcy law will be justifiable on the basis that it is necessary to 
protect the rights of others, namely the creditors, and will not be a breach of the 
Convention.
196
     
However, the court did question the automatic elevation of creditors‟ claims in the context of 
bankruptcy.  The judge questioned whether the „narrow approach‟ adopted in bankruptcy 
cases, whereby it is only in „exceptional circumstances‟ that the court will even consider the 
possibility of refusing sale, was consistent with the Convention.   
The judge emphasised the effect of automatically prioritising the interests of creditors, 
particularly when there are other occupiers, besides the debtor, who will be affected by an 
order for possession and sale against the property.  The current approach:     
…requires the court to adopt an almost universal rule, which prefers the property 
rights of the bankrupt‟s creditors to the property and/or personal rights of third parties, 
members of his family, who owe the creditors nothing.
197
   
The issue that seemed to concern the court was the tendency to refer to the occupiers‟ home 
interest in merely cursory terms: since the interests of creditors prevailed as a matter of 
course, the potential human rights implications in respect of home and family were being 
effectively ignored.  Mr Strauss reasoned that: 
The eviction of the family from their home, an event that naturally ensues from the 
operation of the presumption of sale in s335A [of the Insolvency Act 1986], could be 
considered to be an infringement of the right to respect of the home and family life 
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under Article 8 if the presumption is given absolute priority without sufficient 
consideration being given to the Convention rights of the affected family.
198
 
The scope of the potential afforded by the Human Rights Act 1998 to re-evaluate not only the 
outcome of creditor/occupier disputes, but the process by which the relevant interests are 
weighed in the balance, is discussed further in Chapter Ten.
199
  It is suggested, however, that 
the framework of human rights discourse has presented a new perspective on the automatic 
elevation of creditors‟ claims, without any real attempt to consider the nature and weight to 
be attributed to the occupier‟s home interests that has characterised legal analysis in the 
creditor/occupier context in recent decades.       
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has endeavoured to identify the arguments in support of re-evaluating current 
approaches to the creditor/occupier conflict, in light of a more nuanced understanding of the 
occupier‟s home interest.  Although it is recognised that the commercial interests of creditors, 
the availability of credit to fund home ownership and the argument for economic efficiency 
are undoubtedly significant, this chapter argues that the contest between the creditor and the 
occupier should not be ceded to the creditor without further exploration of the broader 
implications of loss of home through creditor possession actions.  The approach proposed by 
Malloy is particularly instructive in this context.  The fundamental basis of Malloy‟s 
approach is recognition of the „incompleteness‟ of economic theory:  
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The underlying question of whether or not an individual should be entitled to an 
education or to shelter cannot be answered by economic analysis alone.  The difficult 
questions of what rights or treatment befits human beings in our society are questions 
that must be answered by means other than economics.  Economics becomes a 
valuable tool only after reason resolves the nature of the right to be explored.
200
 
Malloy suggests that the first step should be to comprehend the values at stake; only once 
these values have been analysed - in a social, community or moral sense - should economic 
analysis be employed as a useful tool by which to determine how best to achieve the goals 
that have been identified.  This is consistent with the argument that, before the respective 
claims of the creditor and the occupier can be weighed against each other in a meaningful 
way – under the exercise of the court‟s discretion to order possession or sale, or when 
reconciling their competing interests within a human rights framework – the starting point 
must be to develop some sense of the meaning of home in law.  Only once the nature of the 
interests at stake has been „worked out‟ can the legislature or the courts legitimate regard 
themselves as conducting a „balancing exercise‟ between the competing claims.       
To date, laws and policies governing disputes between creditors and occupiers have 
not had the benefit of a conceptual framework within which to recognise and take account of 
the non-economic values associated with use and occupation of property as a home, or the 
impact of loss of home through repossession on the occupiers of the property.  Although it is 
often argued that creditors must prevail on economic grounds, this book highlights the need 
to weigh the occupier‟s stake in retaining the home for use and occupation against those 
financial interests.  Furthermore, while there is no ambiguity surrounding the value of the 
property to the creditor, if this value is to be „balanced‟ against the value of the home to the 
occupier, some effort must be made, from a conceptual point of view to develop a clearer 
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concept of the value of home in law.  The significance of home, and the impact of losing 
one‟s home for occupiers, demands a more explicit analysis of the other side of the equation 
– the occupier‟s home interest.  While there is little ambiguity in relation to the value of the 
property to the creditor, the chimera of „home‟ that currently lurks in the shadows of policy 
reasoning is easily ignored or trivialised.  If these interests are to be „balanced‟ one against 
the other, it is necessary to develop a clearer concept of the value of home in law.  At the very 
least, a more coherent legal concept of home would encourage a more explicitly reasoned 
approach when legislative and judicial policy decisions that potentially undermine the 
interests of occupiers in their homes are made.       
Overarching all of this, and arguably hindering the development of a legal concept of 
home, is the argument that the concept of home is not „real‟.  Yet, although epigrams such as 
„home is where the heart is‟ and „there‟s no place like home‟ portray attachment to home as 
sentimental, these expressions, and the responses they describe, are informed by important 
social, psychological, cultural and emotional attachments.  One of the difficulties, from a 
legal perspective, is the inherent intangibility of these responses towards home.  Even aside 
from the commercial clout of the creditors, it is not altogether surprising that the rationally 
underpinned legal system prefers the interests of creditors in the economic value of the house 
to the non-economic interests of occupiers in their homes.  While an occupier‟s interest in the 
property as a home may be intangible, that is certainly not an insurmountable hurdle to the 
recognition of a legally significant interest.  Nevertheless, as Chapter Two has demonstrated, 
even when legal policies are specifically directed at recognising and protecting the „home‟ 
interest of the occupier, they have been, broadly speaking, ineffective.   
This chapter has attempted to set out an argument for greater consideration of home 
interests in the mortgage possession context.  However, in order to proceed with the 
development of a legal concept of home, it is necessary to evaluate the meanings and values 
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of home to the occupier.  At this point, the benefits to be gained from inter-disciplinary 
analysis are highlighted.  Although the idea of „home‟ is often dismissed in legal discourse 
as: „…something ethereal, floating in the air, unconnected to bricks and mortar and land‟;201 
research in other disciplines has established the authenticity of home meanings and 
attachments for occupiers.  While the concept of home has remained relatively under-
developed in law, interest in the meanings and values of home has burgeoned in other 
disciplines in recent years.  This research emphasises that home is indeed a „real‟ 
phenomenon.  Furthermore, empirical and theoretical research in other disciplines could 
usefully contribute to the conceptualisation of home in law.  The meanings and values 
identified by studies in other disciplines could provide a useful conceptual springboard from 
which to launch the search for a concept of home in law.  This cross-disciplinary examination 
of home scholarship is the subject of Chapter Four.        
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